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Seeking Consistency for Prior Consistent Statements:
Amending Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)
LIESA L. RICHTER
The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence was hard at
work in 2013 trying to bring resolution to a mystery that has plagued Rule
801(d)(1)(B) since its enactment thirty-eight years ago. Scholars, judges,
and litigants have long pondered why the drafters of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
carved out a hearsay exemption for prior consistent statements admitted to
repair impeaching attacks on witness motivations, but failed to extend the
same treatment to other similarly situated prior consistencies admitted to
repair other types of impeaching attacks. In May 2013, the Advisory
Committee proposed an amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) in an effort to
end the mysterious disparate treatment of prior consistent witness
statements by expanding the hearsay exemption to include prior consistent
statements ignored by the original Rule.
Although the proposed
amendment is on track to take effect December 1, 2014, it has encountered
strong criticism regarding its potential to liberally admit witness hearsay.
This Article seeks to find a constructive path forward by highlighting the
beneficial purposes of the proposed amendment and exploring criticisms
levied against it. The Article concludes that an amendment of Rule
801(d)(1)(B) is in keeping with the policies underlying the original Rule
and with the broader operation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. After
examining several drafting alternatives for an amended Rule 801(d)(1)(B),
however, the Article concludes that a simple and straightforward
amendment that applies a single standard to substantive availability of all
prior consistent statements would be superior to the proposed amendment
because it would eliminate the confusion that has plagued the existing Rule
and chart a clear course for prior consistent statements in the future.
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Seeking Consistency for Prior Consistent Statements:
Amending Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)
LIESA L. RICHTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Attacking a witness’s testimony represents a standard and timehonored trial technique. Indeed, there are numerous ways in which a
witness may be discredited on the stand.1 Following such an impeaching
attack, the proponent of the witness may wish to rehabilitate the witness in
the eyes of the fact-finder.2 When a trial witness’s motivations, memory,
or consistency are challenged during cross-examination, pre-trial “prior
consistent statements” of the witness may serve a powerful rehabilitative
purpose.3 At common law, such prior consistent statements were not to be
considered for their truth by the fact-finder due to the prohibition on
hearsay evidence, but were useful to demonstrate the constancy of the
witness’s story.4 In other words, the evidence for the jury to consider had
to emanate from the trial testimony of the witness and the prior statements
could be used only to assess the witness’s credibility on the stand.
The Federal Rules of Evidence altered the common law treatment of
some prior consistent statements through Rule 801(d)(1)(B) by allowing
them to be considered for their truth, as well as for their rehabilitative
purpose, when “offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the
declarant recently fabricated [testimony] or acted from a recent improper
influence or motive in so testifying.”5 Although this change affected the
use of prior consistent statements after an impeaching attack on the
witness’s motivations, it curiously did not alter the common law with
*
Thomas P. Hester Presidential Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law. I would like
to thank Professor Ed Imwinkelried, Professor Katheleen Guzman, and Professor Murray Tabb for
many helpful comments on a prior draft of this Article.
1
See 1 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 33, at 205 (7th ed. 2013)
[hereinafter MCCORMICK] (“[T]he common law and the Federal Rules liberally admit impeaching
evidence.”).
2
See id. § 47, at 303 (noting that the “witness’s proponent must be given an opportunity to . . .
present[] evidence rehabilitating the [impeached] witness”).
3
See id. § 47, at 307 (noting use of prior consistent statements as one of two principal methods of
rehabilitation).
4
See id. § 47, at 318 (noting that even a witness statement constitutes hearsay if offered for the
truth of the matter asserted, and limiting non-hearsay use of prior consistent statements to rehabilitating
the credibility of a witness).
5
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
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respect to prior consistencies offered to repair other forms of impeachment,
such as attacks on memory or constancy.6 Thus, in the post-Rules
universe, there is disparate treatment of prior consistent statements used to
rehabilitate: some may be considered for their truth by the fact-finder,
while others may be used only to repair and must be accompanied by
limiting instructions cautioning the jury against substantive use.7
In the years since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, this
hearsay exemption for certain prior consistent statements has become
complicated and confused. The difficulty began with the original drafters’
decision to permit substantive use of prior consistent statements after only
one form of impeachment, with no explanation as to why other prior
consistencies relevant to repair other forms of impeachment should not
also be available for substantive use.8 This difficulty was compounded
twenty years later by the Supreme Court’s effort in Tome v. United States9
to make sense of the drafters’ choice to single out one form of
rehabilitation by finding a “premotive” requirement embedded in Rule
801(d)(1)(B).10
As a result of this history, there are several different types of prior
consistent statements that may be treated very differently in federal court
today.11 Following a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive or
influence, a “premotive” prior consistent statement by the witness may be
admitted to rehabilitate and for its truth.12 In contrast, prior consistent
statements made by the witness after the inception of the improper motive
may never be used for their truth.13 Federal courts differ as to whether
such “postmotive” prior consistent statements should be excluded
altogether or whether they may be admitted solely for their non-hearsay

6
See id. (allowing prior statements to be considered for their truth only after an attack on
“influence or motive”).
7
See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 7012, at 151–52
(2011 interim ed.) (noting that certain “prior consistent statements are admitted for corroborative
purposes only and not as substantive evidence; the jury should be instructed accordingly”).
8
See FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note (discussing reasons for allowing substantive
use of prior consistent statements after an impeaching attack on the witness’s motives, without
commentary as to why prior consistent statements cannot be used substantively after other forms of
impeachment).
9
513 U.S. 150 (1995).
10
Id. at 160–62.
11
Most states follow the standards adopted in the Federal Rules of Evidence, extending confusion
into state practice as well. See ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS 10 (2d ed. 2004) (noting generally that most state
codifications of evidence law are similar “in organization and substance to the Federal Rules of
Evidence”).
12
Tome, 513 U.S. at 160.
13
Id. at 156.
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rehabilitative purpose. Finally, prior consistent statements that properly
repair impeaching attacks on witness memory or consistency may never be
admitted for their truth.15 They may, however, be provided to the factfinder for rehabilitative purposes with limiting instructions cautioning
against substantive use.16
To remedy the confusion surrounding Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and to bring
consistency to treatment of prior consistent statements in federal court, the
Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence has proposed an
amendment to the Rule.17 The Committee considered various drafting
alternatives for an amended Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and solicited public
comment on the proposal, as well as input from federal district court
judges.18 Following this process, the Advisory Committee and the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure recently approved
a proposed amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B).19 The proposed amendment
adopts a two category approach to the substantive use of prior consistent
statements, which maintains the current standard for prior consistencies
offered to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive.20 It adds a hearsay exemption to the existing standard for prior
consistent statements offered to rehabilitate a trial witness impeached on

14
Compare United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1273 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A] prior consistent
statement offered for rehabilitation is either admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or it is not admissible
at all.”), with United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 920 (4th Cir. 1997) (reasoning that “the pre-motive
rule of Tome ha[s] no effect” where prior consistent statements are not offered as substantive evidence
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
15
See supra note 6.
16
See GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 7012, at 149, 152 (“A prior consistent statement of the witness
may be admitted without reference to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) when relevant to rehabilitation . . . . for
corroborative purposes only and not as substantive evidence; the jury should be instructed
accordingly.”).
17
Memorandum from Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, Chair of the Advisory Comm. on Evidence
Rules to Honorable Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair of the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure
of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. (May 7, 2013) [hereinafter May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report],
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/EV05-2013.pdf.
18
Id. at 1–4; see also TIM REAGAN & MARGARET S. WILLIAMS, SURVEY OF DISTRICT COURT
JUDGES ON A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 801(D)(1)(B) CONCERNING
PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS app. (2012) [hereinafter FJC SURVEY], available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule801d1b.pdf/$file/rule801d1b.pdf (providing the email
distributed to all district court judges asking for comments about the possibility of amending Rule
801(d)(1)(B)).
19
See May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 17, at 1 (seeking “final Standing
Committee approval and transmittal to the Judicial Conference of the United States . . . of an
amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B)”); see also REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE
RULES 15 (2013), reprinted in COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., AGENDA BOOK 33 (2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/R
ulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/ST2014-01.pdf (noting that the Standing Committee
approved the amendment by a voice vote).
20
May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 17, at 3.
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other grounds.
The proposed amendment will be reviewed by the
Judicial Conference and passed to the Supreme Court for consideration.22
Pending these additional steps, the amendment is on track to take effect on
December 1, 2014.23
If adopted, the amendment would expand the hearsay exemption
currently available for prior consistent statements to include prior
consistent statements offered to repair other types of impeaching attacks on
a witness.24 The goal of the proposed amendment is to eliminate the
disparate treatment of similarly situated prior consistent statements at trial,
as well as the need for confusing limiting instructions that may befuddle a
lay jury.25 Yet the proposed amendment has received mixed reviews.
Though some commentators generally support the expansion of the
hearsay exemption, others have sharply criticized any effort to broaden the
admissibility of prior witness statements.26 Still others, while supportive of
a change, have criticized the specific drafting choices inherent in the
proposed amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B).27
This Article explores the policies underlying the proposed amendment,
as well as criticisms levied against it. The Article contends that an
amendment that brings consistency to treatment of prior consistent
statements is in keeping with the policies behind original Rule
801(d)(1)(B). Further, this Article argues that rational evidence rules that
treat similarly situated evidence in a symmetrical fashion ultimately further
the goals of efficiency and fairness that underscore the Federal Rules. The
Article also gives in-depth consideration to criticisms of the proposal,
however, highlighting potential unintended consequences of the proposed
amendment. In response to these concerns, the Article explores drafting
alternatives for an amended Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and suggests revisions that
have the potential to curb the dangers suggested by its critics, while
maintaining its beneficial purpose. The Article ultimately proposes a
21
See id. at 3 (adding “to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness when attacked on
another ground” to the existing rule).
22
See Pending Rules Amendments, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/p
ending-rules.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (outlining the steps taken following approval by the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure).
23
ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, AGENDA BOOK 5 (2013), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Evidence/EV2013-10.pdf
(“Barring any unforeseen developments, these amendments will become effective on December 1,
2014.”).
24
May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 17, at 2.
25
Id.; see also David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 407, 449 n.163 (2013) (examining limiting and other evidentiary instructions and their effect on a
lay jury).
26
See infra Part III.B.
27
See May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 17, at 2 (noting “largely negative” but
“sparse” public comment on the proposed amendment).
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simple and straightforward amendment that discards the language of the
existing rule in favor of a single standard allowing substantive use of all
rehabilitative prior consistent statements. A single standard amendment is
best suited to eliminate the confusion that has plagued Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
and to chart a clear course for prior consistent statements in the future.
Part II of this Article examines the common law history of prior
consistent statements, as well as the treatment of prior consistencies under
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part II describes Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of it in Tome v. United
States, and the ramifications of that decision for federal trial practice. Part
III describes the proposed amendment that would expand existing Rule
801(d)(1)(B) and the policies supporting it. Part III also articulates and
examines the criticisms and concerns that have arisen in response to the
current proposal. Part IV seeks a path forward for Rule 801(d)(1)(B) that
achieves the rational and consistent treatment of similarly situated prior
consistent statements, and also accounts for the risk of indiscriminate
admission of witness hearsay feared by critics. In so doing, Part IV
analyzes four alternatives to the existing proposal, identifying the potential
benefits and drawbacks inherent in each. Part IV ultimately suggests a
concise amendment to expand Rule 801(d)(1)(B) that promises to
harmonize treatment of all similarly situated prior consistencies. This
proposed revision of the amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) would focus trial
judges and litigants on the fundamental rehabilitative purpose of prior
consistent statements and on the appropriate contextual analysis that serves
as a gateway to expanded substantive use of prior consistent statements.
II. THE INCONSISTENT HISTORY OF PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
A. The Common Law Approach to Impeachment and Rehabilitation
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,
evidentiary decisions were regulated by the common law.28 At common
law, attorneys routinely used various impeachment techniques to
Following an
undermine the credibility of testifying witnesses.29
impeaching attack on a witness, the proponent of the witness often
responded with rehabilitative information designed to repair any damage to
the witness’s credibility.30 There were two overriding principles governing
rehabilitation at common law that remain constant today. First, a witness
may not be rehabilitated unless an opponent previously launched some
28
See PARK ET AL., supra note 11, at 9–10 (noting that the “common law of evidence evolved
over the centuries” that preceded the enactment of Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975).
29
MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 33, at 205.
30
See id. § 47, at 303 (describing rehabilitation).
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impeaching attack on that witness.
In other words, “bolstering” the
credibility of a testifying witness whose credibility has yet to be contested
is prohibited.32 Second, any rehabilitation of a witness must repair
credibility at the point of attack.33 An impeaching attack on a witness’s
ability to recall, for example, should not be repaired with a showing of the
witness’s honesty. Likewise, a showing of honesty does not counter the
damage done to the witness’s faulty memory. The trial judge, in his or her
discretion—aided by the arguments of vigilant counsel—must police these
two overriding principles on a contextual basis. The trial judge must
determine whether an impeaching attack occurred, what type of attack
occurred, and whether the proffered rehabilitation is appropriately
responsive.34
At common law, prior out-of-court statements made by an impeached
witness that were consistent with trial testimony were considered helpful in
repairing credibility in certain circumstances. More specifically, courts
recognized that prior consistent statements could repair the credibility of a
trial witness whose motivations had been questioned, whose memory had
been challenged, or whose consistency in describing pertinent events had
been attacked.
A common type of impeachment that historically has opened the door
to use a prior consistent statement is the attack on a witness’s motivations
for testifying at trial. For example, if a opposing counsel suggested on
cross-examination that a witness’s trial testimony was recently developed
as a result of some improper influence or other motivation, such as a bribe,
pre-trial statements by the witness that are consistent with the trial version
may serve to mitigate such an attack. Specifically, prior consistent
statements would powerfully rebut the suggestion that trial testimony was
the product of a bribe if those statements were made prior to the alleged
bribe.35 In these circumstances, courts typically permitted rehabilitation
with prior consistent statements before the enactment of the Federal Rules
of Evidence.36
31

Id. § 47, at 303–04.
See id. (“[O]ne general principle, recognized under both case law and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, is that absent an attack upon credibility, no bolstering evidence is allowed.”).
33
See id. § 47, at 307 (“The rehabilitating facts must meet the impeachment with relative
directness.”).
34
See id. § 47, at 308 (noting that the trial judge has discretion to determine whether
circumstances justify rehabilitative evidence).
35
See 4 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, 801-32 to -33
(8th ed. 2002) (“[O]nce the suggestion is made that trial testimony is fabricated or that the witness has
been unduly influenced, consistent statements made prior to the time when there was a motive for the
witness to lie or the influence was likely are especially probative . . . .”).
36
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (“Prior consistent statements
traditionally have been admissible to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive but not as substantive evidence.”).
32
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In addition, prior consistent statements historically were permitted to
rehabilitate some trial witnesses whose memory had been challenged on
cross-examination.37 For example, if an opponent suggested that a witness
had forgotten important details about an underlying event as a result of the
passage of time between that event and trial, that witness’s prior consistent
statement made close in time to the foundational event could serve as
powerful rebuttal.38 On the other hand, a prior consistent statement made
by the witness shortly before trial and long after underlying events might
not answer the charge of forgetfulness and might not be useful to
rehabilitate.
Finally, in some limited circumstances, courts at common law
recognized that a witness’s prior consistent statement could repair an attack
launched on that witness’s credibility by virtue of a prior inconsistent
statement.39 For example, a prior consistent statement made by the witness
at the same time as the alleged inconsistency might clarify or complete the
witness’s prior statement that the opponent sought to characterize as
inconsistent. In this circumstance, a prior consistency might demonstrate
that the statement offered as impeachment evidence was not really
inconsistent with trial testimony at all. Even a prior statement made by a
trial witness at another time may account for or explain a purported
inconsistency in a way that refutes the impeaching attack.40 As noted
above, the important question in this arena relates to the second principle
of rehabilitation—whether the proposed repair genuinely answers the
impeaching attack.41 Evaluation of the impeachment launched, as well as
the context of the prior consistency, has been critical in determining
whether a prior consistent statement genuinely responds to the use of a
37
MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 49, at 120; see also Edward D. Ohlbaum, The Hobgoblin of the
Federal Rules of Evidence: An Analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Prior Consistent Statements and a New
Proposal, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 231, 257–58 (“Before the enactment of the Federal rules of Evidence,
many commentaries and a few courts suggested that if a witness’ live testimony [was] challenged as the
product of an inaccurate memory or a faulty recollection, a prior consistent statement [could]
legitimately be offered to rebut the attack.” (footnotes omitted)).
38
See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-33 (“[I]f the witness is charged with a bad
memory, a statement by the witness made near to the event and consistent with the in-court testimony
tends to rebut the charge.”).
39
See id. at 801-37 (noting that a prior consistent statement may be admissible “to explain or
clarify an inconsistent statement introduced by the adversary”).
40
See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 47, at 316 (“[W]hen the attacked witness denies making the
inconsistent statement, evidence of consistent statements very near the time of the alleged inconsistent
one is relevant to corroborate his denial.”); see also United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir.
1986) (“When the prior statement tends to cast doubt on whether the prior inconsistent statement was
made or on whether the impeaching statement is really inconsistent with the trial testimony, its use for
rehabilitation purposes is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Such use is also permissible
when the consistent statement will amplify or clarify the allegedly inconsistent statement.”).
41
See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 47, at 315–16 (noting that some inconsistencies “remain[]
despite all consistent statements”).
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prior inconsistent statement and is thus admissible for rehabilitation.
At common law, these basic principles of impeachment and
rehabilitation, applied by the trial judge on a case-by-case basis, governed
the admissibility of prior consistent statements. Of course, out-of-court
statements offered at trial for their truth constituted inadmissible hearsay at
common law.42 Therefore, the prior consistent statements of trial witnesses
would be considered hearsay if offered to prove the truth of the
information conveyed therein. To serve their rehabilitative purposes
described above, however, such statements need not be considered
substantively. The simple fact that the witness previously uttered a
statement that matches trial testimony might serve to repair an attack on
memory, constancy, or improper motivation at the time of trial. At
common law, therefore, such rehabilitative prior consistent statements
were admissible if they satisfied principles of rehabilitation, but solely for
their non-hearsay credibility purposes.43 Prior consistencies could not be
considered for their truth and thus could not assist in building a case.
B. Impeachment and Rehabilitation Under the Federal Rules of Evidence
The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975 to regulate the
admissibility of evidence in federal trials.44 Although the drafters of the
Rules created the most successful set of rules to govern the admissibility of
evidence at trial, they did not seek to exhaustively dictate the admissibility
of every piece of evidence that might be offered at trial. In certain areas,
therefore, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not articulate a specific
standard for evaluating certain types of evidence and leave decisions about
the admissibility of evidence to be governed by common law development
within the federal framework.45
In keeping with this drafting philosophy, the Federal Rules of
Evidence do not comprehensively regulate modes of impeachment and
rehabilitation of trial witnesses.46 In regulating impeachment practices, the
Federal Rules carefully control character evidence demonstrating a

42
See GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 7012, at 149 n.2 (noting that prior consistencies offered for their
truth were excluded under common law).
43
Ohlbaum, supra note 37, at 236.
44
Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88
Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. app. (2012)).
45
See Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REV.
908, 915 (1978) (“In principle, under the Federal Rules no common law of evidence remains. . . . In
reality, of course, the body of common law knowledge continues to exist, though in the somewhat
altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of delegated powers.”).
46
MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 33, at 206 (noting that some impeaching attacks are not
“specifically or completely treated by the Federal . . . Rules of Evidence, but nevertheless they are
implicitly authorized by those rules”).
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witness’s propensity for dishonesty. In addition, the Rules provide some
limitation on the use of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent
statements.48 The Rules also proscribe certain prejudicial forms of
impeachment.49 While covering these areas of impeachment, the Federal
Rules leave other well-accepted types of impeachment unregulated within
Article Six of the Rules governing “Witnesses.” Impeachment of a witness
based on bias, sensory or mental incapacity, or contradiction are not treated
specifically in the Federal Rules.50 Similarly, drafters of the Federal Rules
of Evidence chose not to comprehensively regulate the methods of
rehabilitating impeached trial witnesses.51 While Rule 608(a) governs the
use of character witnesses to demonstrate the trustworthiness of testifying
witnesses for rehabilitative purposes,52 there are no other provisions
outlining proper methods for rehabilitating an impeached trial witness.
Although there may not be specific rules governing well-accepted
areas of impeachment and rehabilitation,53 this type of evidence remains
regulated by Rules 401, 402, and 403, which require that all evidence
admitted be relevant and provide for the exclusion of relevant evidence
when its probative value is substantially outweighed by dangers of unfair
prejudice or other risks to the trial process.54 These Article Four
provisions, therefore, maintain the common law limits on rehabilitation:
rehabilitative evidence must be offered after impeachment and must serve
47
See FED. R. EVID. 608 & 609 (outlining the types of evidence that may be introduced to attack
the character of a witness).
48
See id. 613 (“Extrinsic evidence . . . is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an
opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate
the witness thereon.”).
49
See, e.g., id. 610 (discussing the inadmissibility of evidence relating to beliefs or opinions on
the matter of religion).
50
See 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 6094, at 627 (2d ed. 2007) (“No rules specifically address these . . . three ways to attack witness
credibility.”); see also United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51 (1984) (“[T]he Rules do not by their
terms deal with impeachment for ‘bias,’ although they do expressly treat impeachment by character
evidence and conduct, . . . by evidence of conviction of a crime, . . . and by showing religious beliefs or
opinion.”).
51
See 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 50, § 6206, at 598 (noting that the Federal Rules of
Evidence “leave unanswered many questions surrounding the admissibility of prior consistent
statements”).
52
See FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (“A witness’s credibility may be . . . supported by testimony about the
witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the
form of an opinion about that character. But evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the
witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.”).
53
See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-37 (noting that Rules 401 and 402 justify the
admission of prior consistencies for repair purposes); see also Abel, 469 U.S. at 51 (discussing the
continuing viability of impeachment for bias under Rules 401 and 402 despite an absence of specific
rules governing impeachment technique).
54
See FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevant evidence); id. 402 (providing for the admission of
relevant evidence); id. 403 (allowing for the exclusion of relevant evidence with the potential to
negatively impact a trial).
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to repair the attack actually launched.
Therefore, for prior consistent
statements to be admissible under the Federal Rules for their traditional
non-hearsay rehabilitative purpose, they must have some tendency to refute
a specific attack made on the credibility of the witness.56 Further, the
probative value of a rehabilitating prior consistent statement must not be
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or other dangers.57
C. The Federal Rules of Evidence and Hearsay Treatment of Prior
Statements by Testifying Witnesses
In approaching limits on the admissibility of hearsay evidence, the
drafters of the Federal Rules took a much more hands-on approach,
creating a comprehensive definition of hearsay in Rule 801;58 setting forth
twenty-nine hearsay “exceptions” in Rules 803, 804, and 807;59 and
classifying eight other statements as “not hearsay” under Rule 801(d)(1)
and (d)(2).60 In crafting the Federal Rules of Evidence to replace and
supplement purely common law evidentiary standards governing hearsay,
drafters debated whether to include prior statements of testifying witnesses
within the definition of hearsay at all.61 Some commentators argued for
liberal admission of all prior statements of testifying witnesses because the
witnesses may be subject to full cross-examination at trial.62 Others raised
significant concerns about the broad admissibility of prior witness
statements, positing that parties would rely on pre-prepared witness
statements at trial and transform live testimony into an empty exercise.63
These critics suggested that limitations should remain on the admissibility
of witness hearsay offered at trial for the truth of the matter asserted.64
55
See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 47, at 318 (“[T]he judge has discretion under Rules 401 and
403 to determine whether the particular circumstances justify admission of consistent statements to
rehabilitate the witness.”).
56
See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-34 (“[N]ot every attack on credibility opens the
door for rehabilitation with prior consistent statements; for example, if a witness is attacked for having
an untruthful character, he cannot be rehabilitated with prior consistent statements because such
statements do not respond to the attack that the witness has a character trait for lying.”).
57
FED. R. EVID. 403.
58
Id. 801.
59
Id. 803, 804 & 807.
60
Id. 801(d)(1), (d)(2).
61
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) advisory committee’s note (“Considerable controversy has
attended the question whether a prior out-of-court statement by a person now available for crossexamination concerning it, under oath and in the presence of the trier of fact should be classed as
hearsay.”).
62
See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, 801-28 (“Many commentators have urged that as long as
a witness is present at trial for cross-examination, there are adequate guarantees of trustworthiness, and
that any statement . . . should be admissible.”).
63
Id. at 801-28 (noting the House of Representatives’ restrictive view regarding prior witness
statements and the “compromise” that became Rule 801(d)(1)).
64
Id.
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Ultimately, the Federal Rules of Evidence rejected expansive
admissibility of prior witness statements and carved out only certain prior
statements by testifying witnesses to be treated as “not hearsay” under the
Rules.65 Prior inconsistent and consistent statements by trial witnesses that
satisfy certain criteria may be considered for their truth by the fact-finder.66
In addition, prior statements of identification by a trial witness may be
considered for their truth under the Federal Rules.67
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) permits substantive use of certain prior consistent
statements made by testifying witnesses. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides:
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that
meets the following conditions is not hearsay:
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The declarant
testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior
statement, and the statement: . . .
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered
to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant
recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper
influence or motive in so testifying . . . .68
This hearsay exemption allows a prior consistency, admitted to
rehabilitate a testifying witness after he is impeached for lying or improper
motive or influence, to be used for its substantive, as well as its nonhearsay rehabilitative purpose by the jury.69 Thus, if an opponent suggests
on cross-examination that a witness’s testimony has been altered as a result
of a bribe, for example, the proponent of that witness may admit a pre-trial
statement the witness made before the alleged bribe that matches her trial
testimony. In this context, a prior consistent statement might be used for
its non-hearsay purpose—the simple fact that the witness gave the same
story before the alleged bribe strongly undermines the opponent’s
suggestion that the trial version was concocted as a result of the bribe. The
65

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
Id. 801(d)(1)(A), (B). A prior inconsistent statement by a testifying witness subject to crossexamination concerning the statement may be admitted if it was made under oath and at a prior trial,
hearing, deposition, or other proceeding. Id. 801(d)(1)(A).
67
Id. 801(d)(1)(C).
68
Id. 801(d)(1)(B). The structure of the Rule was altered in the restyling project in 2011. The
restyling of the Rule did not alter its operation, however. See id. 801 advisory committee’s note on
2011 amendment (“The language of Rule 801 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the
Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent
throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any
result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.”).
69
See id. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (“The prior statement is consistent with the
testimony given on the stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission in
evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received generally.”).
66
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fact-finder need not depend on the truthfulness of the prior statement for it
to serve this rehabilitative purpose, and this use of a prior consistency is
permitted outside of the prohibition on hearsay pursuant to the standards of
relevance and probative value articulated in Article Four of the Federal
Rules.70 Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is, therefore, unnecessary to this use of a
testifying witness’s prior consistent statement.
Under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the proponent of the witness may go one
step further and argue to the jury that it should accept the truth of the pretrial statement as well.71 Rather than rely simply on the existence of such a
matching statement, the jury may depend on the accuracy of the pre-trial
statement.
Therefore, the hearsay exemption for prior consistent
statements expands the appropriate use of this already admissible
evidence.72 In permitting the use of certain prior consistencies for their
truth, the Advisory Committee relied upon the common law practice of
admitting such witness statements for rehabilitation.73 Because these prior
consistent statements were typically admitted and published to the factfinder for rehabilitative purposes, the question confronting the drafters of
the Federal Rules was not whether these statements should be admitted, but
rather what purpose they could serve after they were disclosed to the jury.
The drafters chose to expand the permissible use of such prior consistent
statements to allow the jury to consider such statements for their truth, as
well as for their traditional rehabilitative purpose.74
The Advisory Committee articulated two factors counseling in favor of
the substantive use of the admitted statements. First, the Advisory
Committee Note emphasized that these pre-trial statements will be
admitted to rehabilitate only when they match previously admitted trial
testimony.75 It is the consistency between prior statements and trial
testimony that makes them relevant to repair witness credibility.
According to the Advisory Committee Note, the hearsay risks associated
with out-of-court statements are less salient when they are accompanied by
live testimony to the same effect.76 Second, the Advisory Committee
70

See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (“Under the rule, [prior consistent
statements] are substantive evidence.”).
72
See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-35 (noting that the “Advisory Committee did
intend to change the common-law rule, in a rather fundamental way”).
73
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (“Prior consistent statements
traditionally have been admissible to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive but not as substantive evidence.”).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) advisory committee’s note (“If the witness admits on the stand that
he made the statement and that it was true, he adopts the statement and there is no hearsay problem.”);
see also SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-32 (noting that the substance of a prior consistent
statement “is already before the factfinder by way of the witness’s in-court testimony”).
71
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observed that prior consistencies only become relevant to rehabilitate a
witness after opposing counsel opens the door to their admission with
impeachment.77 The fact that the opponent of a prior consistent statement
can exercise control over its admission through the choice of impeachment
options further minimizes any perceived unfairness connected to the
substantive use of prior consistencies. In sum, the Advisory Committee
adopted what could be characterized as a “why not” approach to the
substantive use of prior consistent statements, noting that there is “no
sound reason” why such statements “should not be received generally”
once they are received for rehabilitative purposes.78
The policy justifications originally articulated by the Advisory
Committee for expanding the use of prior consistencies through Rule
801(d)(1)(B) reflect a particular philosophical approach to the interaction
between principles of rehabilitation and hearsay that arose naturally out of
common law practice. By emphasizing that prior consistent statements
traditionally are admitted for rehabilitation purposes,79 the Advisory
Committee Note assumes that the admissibility of such statements is
governed by evidentiary rules outside of hearsay doctrine. Thus the Note
contemplates that the statements will be admitted outside the hearsay
regime and will merely adapt that hearsay regime to the expected reality in
which it will operate. In addition, the original Advisory Committee Note
provides a two-step analysis for the substantive use of prior consistent
statements, with step one revolving around a proper rehabilitative nonhearsay purpose for the statement and step two extending substantive
privileges to statements admitted on that basis.
Accordingly, the Federal Rules of Evidence altered the common law
approach to prior consistent statements covered by Rule 801(d)(1)(B),
allowing them to be used for their truth, as well as for their palliative
rehabilitative purpose.80 Under this Rule, the hearsay doctrine permits
expanded use of prior consistent statements properly admitted for
rehabilitation purposes long recognized under Article Four of the Rules
and its common law antecedents.

77

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note.
Id. In contrast to certain prior consistencies admitted to rehabilitate, the Advisory Committee
did articulate concern regarding the “general and indiscriminate use of previously prepared statements.”
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note.
79
See supra note 73.
80
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (classifying prior consistent statements as “not hearsay”
although they fit the definition of hearsay provided by Rule 801(a)–(c)); see also SALTZBURG ET AL.,
supra note 35, at 801-26 (noting that “[e]very one of the statements discussed in subdivision (d) of the
Rule [801] comes within the hearsay rule as defined in subdivision (c)”).
78
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D. The Prior Consistent Statement Disconnect Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence
In drafting Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the Advisory Committee chose language
tracking the commonly utilized method for repairing an attack on witness
motivation or influence with a prior consistent statement.81 As discussed
above, however, the type of impeachment referenced in Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
is not the only type of impeaching attack that may be repaired with a prior
consistency.
Prior consistent statements sometimes can serve to
rehabilitate a witness whose memory or consistency has been attacked, in
addition to a witness whose motivations have been challenged.82
By choosing language specific to only one method of impeachment
and rehabilitation, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence singled out
one type of rehabilitative prior consistent statement for substantive use.83
Under the Rule, prior consistent statements offered to repair attacks of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motivation may be considered
for their truth. Prior consistencies admitted to rehabilitate other types of
impeaching attacks, such as on memory or witness consistency, have been
left out in the cold. Consistent with the common law approach to prior
consistent statements generally, these prior consistencies may be used only
for their non-hearsay rehabilitative purposes, if any, but may never be
considered for their truth.84 For example, if an opponent suggests on crossexamination that a witness has forgotten details of underlying events due to
the passage of time, a prior statement by that witness made close in time to
the underlying events that matches the trial testimony may rehabilitate the
allegation of forgetfulness. Accordingly, the prior consistent statement
should be admitted for its non-hearsay rehabilitative purpose. In contrast
to prior consistencies admitted to repair attacks on witness motivations,
however, this prior consistent statement could not be considered
substantively because this type of prior consistency is not included within
the language of the Rule 801(d)(1)(B) hearsay exemption.85 This
disconnect between different breeds of prior consistent statements requires
81
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (defining a statement as not hearsay if it is “consistent with the
declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant . . . acted
from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying”).
82
See GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 7012, at 149 (“A prior consistent statement of the witness may be
admitted without reference to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) when relevant to rehabilitation in a manner other than
refutation encompassed in Rule 801(d)(1)(B).”).
83
See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 159 (1995) (noting that the Rule singles out prior
consistent statements used for only one type of rehabilitation).
84
See GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 7012, at 151–52 (noting that such prior consistent statements
may be admitted “for corroborative purposes only and not as substantive evidence.”); see also
SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-33 (noting such statements “may be admitted only as proof
of the witness’s credibility, and not as substantive evidence”).
85
See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
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that those admitted solely to rehabilitate outside the strictures of Rule
801(d)(1)(B) be accompanied by a limiting instruction informing the jury
that the statement may be used to evaluate the credibility of the witness,
but may not be taken as true.86
This dichotomy between different breeds of prior consistent statements
has existed in practice under the Federal Rules of Evidence since their
adoption in 1975.87 Based upon the policies articulated by the Advisory
Committee in adopting Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the reasons for this differential
treatment are difficult to discern. If a prior consistent statement is admitted
to repair an impeaching attack on a witness’s memory, it too will be
presented to the fact-finder. Similarly, the statement will have to be
consistent with previously received trial testimony to rehabilitate. Finally,
such a prior consistency will be helpful to repair only after the opponent
opens the door with a challenge to the witness’s ability to recall.
Notwithstanding these identical considerations, prior consistencies offered
to repair attacks on memory are not admissible for their truth under Rule
801(d)(1)(B) and may be offered only for their non-hearsay purposes
consistent with pre-Rules practice. In 1995, the United States Supreme
Court attempted to provide a justification for this differential treatment of
prior consistencies and, in so doing, found an additional limitation
embedded in Rule 801(d)(1)(B).
E. Tome v. United States: The Supreme Court Weighs In
In Tome v. United States, Petitioner Tome was convicted of sexually
abusing his four-year-old daughter following a divorce that gave him
primary custody of her.88 The victim was six and a half years old at the
time of trial and had a difficult time on the stand.89 She gave “one- and
two-word answers” on direct examination by the prosecution in response to
“a series of leading questions” about the defendant’s conduct.90 The
defense cross-examined the child over the course of two trial days, asking
her 348 questions and suggesting that she concocted the story of abuse to
avoid having to return to her father after spending summer vacation with
her mother.91 The child appeared reluctant to answer questions about the
alleged abuse and took as many as fifty-five seconds to respond to defense
questions.92 On the second day of cross-examination, the child appeared to
“be losing concentration” and the trial judge remarked “[w]e have a very
86

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See supra note 44.
88
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 159 (1995).
89
Id. at 153–54.
90
Id. at 153.
91
Id.
92
Id.
87
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difficult situation here.”
Following the child’s stilted testimony, the prosecution called six
witnesses who testified to the victim’s out-of-court statements, revealing to
the jury “a total of seven [hearsay] statements made by [the victim]
describing the alleged sexual assaults.”94 In contrast to the victim’s trial
testimony, these out-of-court statements very powerfully implicated Tome
and offered significantly more detail regarding the alleged abuse than the
child had managed to give on the stand.95 The trial court admitted all of
the victim’s hearsay statements pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) over the
objection of defense counsel, finding that the prior statements were
consistent with the trial testimony and rebutted the defense’s implied
accusation that her trial testimony was motivated by a desire to return to
her mother.96
Following his conviction, Tome appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the victim’s statements were
not admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) because they were all made after
primary custody had been awarded to Tome at a time when the victim was
similarly motivated to return to her mother.97 Tome argued that such
postmotive consistent statements were equally likely to suffer from the
custody motivations alleged by the defense and, hence, failed to refute the
allegation of improper motivation.98 The Tenth Circuit affirmed Tome’s
conviction, rejecting a hard and fast premotive limitation for prior
consistent statements admitted through Rule 801(d)(1)(B).99 Specifically,
the Tenth Circuit found that the proper scope of witness rehabilitation
simply was not dictated by the hearsay provision of Rule 801(d)(1)(B):
[T]he pre-motive requirement is a function of the relevancy
rules, not the hearsay rules . . . [and] as a function of
relevance, the pre-motive rule is clearly too broad . . .
because it is simply not true that an individual with a motive
to lie always will do so.100
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed Tome’s conviction,
finding admission of the victim’s prior statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
erroneous.101 The Court held that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) allows admission of
93

Id. at 154.
Id.
95
See id. (describing testimony by the child’s babysitter that the girl stated that “she did not want
to return to her father because he ‘gets drunk and he thinks I’m his wife’”).
96
Id.
97
Id. at 155.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342, 350 (10th Cir. 1993), overruled by 513 U.S. 150.
101
Tome, 513 U.S. at 167.
94
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prior consistent statements only if they were made prior to the time that the
charged motive to fabricate arose.102 According to the Court, such a
temporal premotive requirement was uniformly applied at common law in
admitting prior consistent statements by witnesses impeached with an
accusation of an improper motive.103 The Court found that the Federal
Rules of Evidence were designed to be interpreted consistently with
common law standards in the absence of express language to the
contrary.104 Finding no rejection of the “common law premotive”
limitation in the text of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or in the Advisory Committee
Notes, the Court held that the hearsay exemption implicitly mandated a
similar “premotive” limitation.105
According to the Court, such “premotive” prior consistent statements
provide particularly compelling and reliable rebuttal of an impeaching
attack.106 If a witness related the same story prior to the existence of a
particular motive to lie, an opponent’s accusation that trial testimony was
altered as a result of that motive is plainly refuted.107 Therefore, the Court
reasoned that the premotive requirement justified extending a hearsay
exemption to only one type of prior consistent statement:
If consistent statements are admissible without reference to
the timeframe we find imbedded in the Rule, there appears
no sound reason not to admit consistent statements to rebut
other forms of impeachment as well. Whatever objections
can be leveled against limiting the Rule to this designated
form of impeachment and confining the rebuttal to those
statements made before the fabrication or improper influence
or motive arose, it is clear to us that the drafters of Rule
801(d)(1)(B) were relying upon the common-law temporal
requirement.108
Notwithstanding the temporal priority requirement imposed by Tome,
the Court acknowledged the possibility that a postmotive statement might
repair an impeaching attack under some circumstances.109 Still, the Court
found that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) would not allow the substantive use of such
102

Id. at 156.
Id. at 155–56.
104
See id. at 160 (noting that the language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) tracks the language of common
law cases, evincing an intent “to carry over the common-law premotive rule”).
105
Id.
106
See id. at 158 (explaining that charges of recent fabrication or improper motive are “capable of
direct and forceful refutation through introduction of out-of-court consistent statements that predate the
alleged fabrication, influence, or motive”).
107
Id.
108
Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
109
Id. at 158–59.
103
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postmotive prior consistent statements.
In sum, the Tome Court
articulated a “premotive” limitation implicitly embedded within Rule
801(d)(1)(B) and posited that the existence of this inchoate requirement
justified the dichotomy between prior consistencies admissible for their
truth under the Rule and all others that may be admitted only for their nonhearsay rehabilitative purposes.
In so doing, the Supreme Court effected a subtle philosophical shift in
the approach to rehabilitation taken by Article Eight of the Rules
governing hearsay evidence. In contrast to the approach reflected in the
original Advisory Committee Note that presupposed that admissibility of
prior consistencies would be decided under other rules, the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) discerned the drafters’
intention to regulate appropriate rehabilitation practices within Article
Eight of the Federal Rules of Evidence. According to the Court, the
drafters of the Federal Rules singled out only one type of prior consistent
statement because of its unique rehabilitative reliability ensured by the
silent premotive requirement.111 Although the dissent in Tome emphasized
that rehabilitation requirements arise out of relevancy rules and not hearsay
rules,112 the majority rejected that view and found that the Article Eight
hearsay exemption was designed to cabin proper rehabilitation.113
Accordingly, the Tome decision appeared to shift some of the authority for
rehabilitation standards to the hearsay rules.
F. The Post-Tome Universe for Prior Consistent Statements
At common law, all prior consistent statements admitted at trial were
used similarly for their rehabilitative non-hearsay purpose.114 In contrast,
following adoption of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of it in Tome, prior consistent statements made by testifying
witnesses are treated differently at trial depending on their timing and the
type of impeaching attack to which they respond.

110
See id. at 158–59 (recognizing that there may be instances when postmotive out-of-court
statements “have some probative force in rebutting a charge of fabrication or improper influence or
motive,” but observing that “those statements refute the charged fabrication in a less direct and forceful
way”).
111
See id. at 157 (remarking that “the forms of impeachment within the Rule’s coverage are the
ones in which the temporal requirement makes the most sense” because they are “capable of direct and
forceful refutation”).
112
See id. at 169 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The basic issue in this case concerns not hearsay, but
relevance.”).
113
See id. at 164 (majority opinion) (“That certain out-of-court statements may be relevant does
not dispose of the question whether they are admissible.”).
114
See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
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1. Premotive Prior Consistent Statements
If a trial witness is accused of having an improper motive or influence,
either expressly or impliedly, the proponent of the witness may seek to
offer a prior statement by the witness that is consistent with the challenged
trial testimony. When this prior statement pre-dates the charged motive or
influence upon the witness’s testimony, the fact-finder may consider the
prior statement in evaluating the witness’s credibility and for its truth
pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(B).115 This is the use of premotive prior
consistent statements sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Tome.116
2. Postmotive Prior Consistent Statements
Following the Supreme Court’s Tome decision, courts have struggled
with the proper approach to prior consistent statements made after the
charged motive to fabricate arose. Some courts have suggested that Tome
may cover the waterfront for admission of prior consistent statements to
rebut attacks on witness motivation, regulating both proper rehabilitation
and hearsay.117 This view indicates that postmotive statements are
inadmissible for any purpose.118 According to this view, postmotive prior
consistent statements may not be utilized to rehabilitate impeached trial
witnesses or for their truth. As such, postmotive prior consistent
statements are excluded altogether.
In contrast, other courts have held that Tome controls the use of prior
consistent statements for their truth pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(B), but

115
See id. (holding that “[t]he Rule permits the introduction of a declarant’s consistent out-ofcourt statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive only when
those statements were made before the charged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive”).
116
Id.
117
See, e.g., United States v. Lozada-Rivera, 177 F.3d 98, 103 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that,
although the issue did not need to be addressed directly in the case at bar, “[i]t is a matter of some
debate whether Rule 801(d)(1)(B) controls prior consistent statements of all stripes or whether a more
relaxed test applies when a prior statement is offered for a rehabilitative purpose”); see also United
States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1273 n.12 (9th Cir. 1989) (observing, prior to the Tome decision, that
“[t]here is . . . no class of prior consistent statements, offered for purposes of rehabilitation, that does
not fall within the literal scope of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)”).
118
See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 47, at 315 (noting that some commentators read Tome as a
“signal” that the premotive limitation applies to rehabilitative use of prior consistencies as well);
SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-38 (reflecting the view that postmotive consistent statements
“will not be admissible at all, either substantively or for impeachment purposes.”); see also REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES app. (2013), reprinted in COMM. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., AGENDA BOOK 832 (2013)
[hereinafter Committee Note to Proposed Rule], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesA
ndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/ST2011-06.pdf (noting that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) “led to
some conflict in the cases,” with some courts distinguishing “between substantive and rehabilitative use
for prior consistent statements, while others appeared to hold that prior consistent statements must be
admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or not at all”).

958

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:937
119

does not regulate their use solely for rehabilitative purposes.
These
courts have found that postmotive prior consistent statements may be used
to repair an impeached witness’s credibility when the trial judge, in the
exercise of his or her discretion, finds that they rehabilitate.120 Even if
these statements are published to the fact-finder for a limited credibility
purpose, such postmotive prior consistent statements may not be used for
their truth because they do not satisfy the premotive limitation announced
in Tome. This approach to prior consistent statements is reminiscent of the
philosophy reflected in the original Advisory Committee Note to Rule
801(d)(1)(B) regarding authority for proper rehabilitation—namely, that
standards of rehabilitation are entirely governed by considerations of
relevance and probative value and that the hearsay rules affect only
substantive use.
3. Prior Consistent Statements that Repair Other Impeaching Attacks
Although prior consistent statements have been used routinely to
rehabilitate a trial witness whose motivations for testifying have been
called into question, prior consistent statements can repair other types of
impeaching attacks, as described above.121 For example, when a witness is
accused of being forgetful at trial, a prior consistent statement that was
made close in time to underlying events can constitute powerful
rehabilitation. In addition, the impeachment of a trial witness based upon
some prior inconsistencies may be remedied by reference to prior
consistencies that refute the attack—often by placing statements in context.
While prior consistent statements may be introduced to respond to
such impeachment methods, the statements may never be considered for
their truth under these circumstances.122 Rule 801(d)(1)(B) expressly
eliminates a hearsay objection to only one breed of prior consistent
statement—one offered to rebut a charge of improper motive or influence
or recent fabrication.123 Prior consistent statements that aim to repair
attacks on memory or constancy do not fall within the narrow category
defined by the hearsay exemption.124 Thus, while these prior consistent
statements may be introduced as relevant rehabilitation evidence, they may
be considered only for the non-hearsay purpose of assessing credibility and
may never be relied upon for their truth by the fact-finder.
119
See United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 27–28 (1st Cir. 2001) (describing the view that
postmotive statements may be admitted for rehabilitation purposes as the “majority” view).
120
See Laird C. Kirkpatrick, An Unneeded Hearsay Amendment: No Need to Expand
Admissibility of Prior Consistent Statements as Substantive Evidence, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 15, 2012, at 43
(noting that many courts admit postmotive statements solely for rehabilitation purposes).
121
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
122
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
123
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
124
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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***
The language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and Tome’s interpretation of it
have affected the use of prior consistent statements at trial in multiple
ways. First, similarly situated prior consistent statements are treated
differently. Premotive prior consistent statements that repair attacks on
motivation are admissible to rehabilitate, as well as for their truth. All
other prior consistent statements by a witness may be admitted for their
credibility purposes alone, but may never be relied upon by the jury for
their truth. Second, this disparate treatment of similarly situated prior
consistent statements has created a need for limiting instructions to caution
jurors against considering prior consistent statements for their truth. It is
likely difficult for lay jurors to appreciate the subtle distinction between
reliance upon pre-trial consistent witness statements solely for
rehabilitative purposes and use of those statements for their truth. Where
the admitted prior statements, by definition, match trial testimony and are
offered to evaluate the truth-telling of the witness on the stand, an
instruction that warns the jury not to consider the matching consistent
statement to be true is confusing to say the least. Such confusion has led
some to seek more uniformity with respect to admitted prior consistent
statements.125
III. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
In 2011, the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence
began formally considering an amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to bring
uniformity to the treatment of prior consistent statements at trial.126 With
the assistance of the Federal Judicial Center, federal district court judges
were surveyed concerning a proposed amendment, and results of the
survey were reported in March 2012.127 Following the survey, a revised
125
See May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that the proposal to amend
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) originated with Judge Frank W. Bullock during his tenure as a member of the
Standing Committee).
126
See Memorandum from the Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, Standing Comm. on Rules of
Practice & Procedure, to the Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Evidence
Procedure (Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Repor
ts/EV04-2011.pdf (noting the “[p]ossible [a]mendment of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)” as an “[i]nformation
[i]tem”). Although formal consideration of the current proposal began in 2011, calls to amend Rule
801(d)(1)(B) began more than a decade earlier. See Frank W. Bullock, Jr. & Steven Gardner, Prior
Consistent Statements and the Premotive Rule, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 509, 517 (1997) (advocating for
substantive admissibility of all prior consistencies that are admissible to rehabilitate).
127
FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 1. The Federal Judicial Center developed the eight question
email survey in collaboration with the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. The
survey was sent to 961 federal district judges and fifty-three percent of the surveyed judges responded.
Id. This survey sought input regarding an early draft of the proposed amendment that discarded the
existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B) language in favor of a single standard allowing substantive use of all prior
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version of the proposed amendment was published for notice and comment
in 2012–2013.128 At its May 2013 meeting, the Advisory Committee
approved a third and final draft Rule as a proposed amendment to Rule
801(d)(1)(B).129
A. The Proposed Amendment to the Rule
The proposed amendment would maintain the current language of Rule
801(d)(1)(B), but would expand the Rule’s coverage to include prior
consistent statements offered to rehabilitate types of impeaching attacks
omitted from the existing provision. The version of the amendment
ultimately proposed by the Advisory Committee reads as follows:
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that
meets the following conditions is not hearsay:
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The declarant
testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior
statement, and the statement: . . .
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is
offered:
(i) to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant
recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper
influence or motive in so testifying; or
(ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness
when attacked on another ground; . . . .130
In essence, the proposed amendment preserves the standard currently
found in Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and the Tome premotive gloss on that standard.
The amendment adds an additional category of prior consistencies
available for substantive use, characterized as those “offered” to
rehabilitate on grounds not covered by the original Rule. The proposed
Advisory Committee Note accompanying the amendment cites the
consistent statements “otherwise admissible to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness.” Id.
at 2.
128
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE,
BANKRUPTCY, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: REQUEST FOR
COMMENT 217 (2012) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/rules-published-comment.pdf; May 2013 Advisory Comm.
Report, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that the Standing Committee approved the proposed amendment for
publication at its June 2012 meeting).
129
See May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that the proposed
amendment and committee note were “modified slightly from the versions issued for publication to
address certain concerns raised by public comment”).
130
Id. at 3. The emphases stress where the proposed language differs from the current version.
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differential hearsay treatment of similarly situated prior consistent
statements, as well as conflict in the case law, as reasons for the change.131
Cautioning against liberal interpretation of the Rule to allow indiscriminate
use of prior witness statements, the Advisory Committee Note emphasizes
that principles of relevance and probative value continue to control
decisions about admitting prior consistent statements for rehabilitation and
clarifies that improper bolstering of a witness remains disallowed under the
Rules.132 Finally, the Advisory Committee Note clarifies that the
amendment preserves the ruling in Tome and maintains the premotive
requirement for prior consistent statements offered to repair attacks of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motivation.133
B. Concerns and Criticisms
The district court judges surveyed by the Federal Judicial Center with
respect to an earlier version of the proposed amendment expressed support
for the general expansion of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), with fifty-seven percent of
responding judges approving of an amendment to the existing Rule.134
However, the proposed amendment has encountered criticism and
expressions of concern from the bar, the bench, and the academy.135
First, some critics have discouraged adoption of the amendment by
arguing that it aims to fix a non-existent problem. Indeed, several
commenters in the Federal Judicial Center survey made remarks such as
“[i]f it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” and “this proposal [appears] to be a
solution in search of a problem.”136 These critics, who raise no particular
substantive objection to the amendment, believe that the current Rule
functions well and appropriately. Others commented that the issue of
131
See Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 832 (noting the limited coverage of
the original Rule).
132
Id. at 833.
133
Id. at 832.
134
See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 23 25 (explaining that fifty-seven percent of surveyed
judges disagreed with the statement “Rule 801(d)(1)(B) should not be amended” and concluding that
the survey “showed substantial support for the proposed amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B)”).
135
See, e.g., id. at 8 (detailing comments from district court judges, including: “Allowing such
statements could substantially bolster the weak in-court testimony of a questionable witness” and “This
rule change would encourage a calculating declarant to deliberately contrive to take advantage of the
Rule in contemplation of litigation”); see also Kirkpatrick, supra note 120, at 43 (“The committee has
not provided a compelling justification for further modifying the long-standing definition of hearsay.”);
Comment from Honorable Joan N. Ericksen to Honorable Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of
Practice & Procedure 4 (Dec. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Judge Ericksen Comment], available at http://ww
w.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/2012-evidence-comments/12-EV-001-comment.pdf
(“Short of foregoing cross-examination altogether, it will be difficult for an opponent to have any
control over whether a testifying declarant will be deemed to need some rehabilitation of his
‘credibility as a witness.’”).
136
See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 20, 23 (responding to “Question Eight” regarding whether
any amendment should be proposed).
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limited use of prior consistent statements arises so infrequently in actual
trial practice that any perceived problem simply is not worth remedying.137
While these critics do not assert any danger associated with expanding the
Rule, they simply deem change unnecessary.
Other commentators have expressed more substantive concerns
regarding the fair operation of an amended Rule. These critics fear a
drastic increase in the use of prior witness statements at trial arising from
an amendment.138 According to this criticism, a rule that allows for
expanded use of admitted prior consistent statements will lead to an
increase in admission of such statements. Indeed, the federal district
judges surveyed overwhelmingly predicted that an amendment would lead
to increased admission of prior consistent statements at trial.139 Under this
view, an amendment to the Rule 801(d)(1)(B) hearsay exemption could be
interpreted as a blessing for admission of all prior consistent statements
made by impeached trial witnesses.140 As commentators have observed:
“The risk of an unbridled use of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is . . . that the Trial
Court may play fast and loose with principles of relevance, shifting the
trial from a focus on in-court witnesses to out-of-court statements.”141
Critics fear that an amended provision could undercut the original 1975
compromise that treats out-of-court witness statements as hearsay with
only limited exceptions.142 These commentators anticipate that expanded
application of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) will lead litigants to rely heavily upon
prepared pre-trial witness statements rather than on the preferred in-court
trial testimony under oath and subject to cross-examination.143

137

See, e.g., id. at 3 (“This issue has never come up in seventeen years on the federal bench.”).
See Kirkpatrick, supra note 120, at 43 (criticizing the proposal that would “significantly
expand the admissibility of prior consistent statements as substantive evidence”); Judge Ericksen
Comment, supra note 135, at 3 4 (“[I]t seems inevitable that more prior statements would be heard by
fact-finders under the amended rule.”).
139
See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 9 (showing that seventy-two percent of federal district
judges agreed there would be greater admission of prior consistent statements under the amendment);
id. at 25 (“The survey also showed support for the empirical prediction that the amendment would lead
to an increase in prior consistent statements coming into evidence.”).
140
See Judge Ericksen Comment, supra note 135, at 4 (suggesting that the amendment could
permit substantive use of prior consistent statements whenever a testifying witness needs “some
rehabilitation of his ‘credibility as a witness’”).
141
SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-37.
142
See Kirkpatrick, supra note 120, at 43 (noting that Federal Rules rejected a liberal approach
that would have allowed admission of all prior statements by testifying witnesses).
143
See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 24 (“It won’t take long for lawyers to recognize this
amendment as a way to build a case with out-of-court statements.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court opined
that liberal substantive admission of prior consistent statements could “shift” the “whole emphasis of
the trial . . . to the out-of-court statements, not the in-court ones.” Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150,
165 (1995).
138

2014]

SEEKING CONSISTENCY FOR PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS

963

IV. TO AMEND OR NOT TO AMEND: THAT IS THE QUESTION
The proposal to amend Rule 801(d)(1)(B) raises three crucial
questions. First, is any proposed amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
supported by sound evidentiary and rule-making policy? Second,
notwithstanding any beneficial policy justifications, is the proposed
amendment likely to create unintended consequences and to open the
floodgates to expansive use of prior consistent statements at trial? Finally,
if there are both sound justifications for an amendment, as well as
significant trial risks, are there any alternatives to the current proposal that
could promote logical evidentiary policy while minimizing the risk of
improvident use of prior consistent statements?
A. A Laudable Goal: Consistent and Rational Operation of Evidence
Rules
Extending Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to cover all prior consistent statements
admitted to rehabilitate a testifying witness is in keeping with the policies
reflected in the original Advisory Committee Note explaining the hearsay
exemption. As described above, the Advisory Committee Notes reveal
several justifications for allowing substantive use of prior consistent
statements that rehabilitate.
First, the hearsay exemption does not give the fact-finder access to outof-court statements that it would not otherwise receive.144 Under the Rule,
prior consistent statements may be considered for their truth only if they
are admissible for a non-hearsay rehabilitative purpose.145 Thus, the
hearsay exemption merely allows for greater use of out-of-court statements
already received by the fact-finder. Second, the statements at issue must
be “consistent” with trial testimony already subject to cross-examination in
order to qualify as rehabilitative.146 Allowing substantive use of out-ofcourt statements that merely echo previously received trial testimony
decreases the core hearsay risk—i.e., that unreliable out-of-court
statements will be used to build a case.147 Third, such prior consistent
statements may be offered for their non-hearsay rehabilitative purpose only
if the opponent of those statements first opens the door with a specific
impeaching attack on the testifying witness that makes prior consistencies

144
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (noting that such statements
“traditionally have been admissible”).
145
See supra text accompanying notes 68–69, 72.
146
See FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (“The prior statement is consistent
with the testimony given on the stand . . . .”).
147
See David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15 16 (noting that
one of the traditional justifications for the hearsay rule is the unreliability of out-of-court statements).
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148

relevant to repair.
Therefore, the party opponent may control access to
prior consistent statements through careful consideration of impeachment
strategies.149
Logically exploring these policy considerations reveals that the
existing Rule is under-inclusive in permitting substantive use of prior
consistent statements that rebut attacks of recent fabrication or improper
motive only.150 Importantly, the articulated justifications for allowing
substantive use of prior consistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
apply equally when prior consistent statements are admitted to rehabilitate
attacks on memory and consistency. The fact-finder necessarily has access
to these prior consistent statements for their non-hearsay rehabilitative
value. The value in such statements arises out of their consistency with
trial testimony already given by the declarant subject to in court crossexamination. Finally, these prior consistent statements are admissible only
after the opponent opens the door with a triggering challenge to witness
memory or consistency. Based upon the stated rationale for permitting the
hearsay exemption in existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B), there is no satisfactory
reason to limit the hearsay exemption to one type of rehabilitative prior
consistent statement alone.
It is true that many out-of-court statements may be admissible solely
for their limited non-hearsay purposes in some circumstances, but
admissible for their truth in others.151 Indeed, this is a fundamental feature
of hearsay doctrine, and there is nothing irrational about such differential
treatment of out-of-court statements in most contexts. It is critical,
however, to have some logical basis for drawing the line between those
statements that may be admitted for their truth and those that may not. In
contexts outside of the prior consistent statement, such a rational
distinction exists and can be understood and defended. Because the
policies underlying existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B) apply equally to other prior
consistent statements not captured by its language, a logical distinction is
lacking in this context.
In contrast, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) provides a hearsay exemption for a
limited class of prior inconsistent statements made by testifying

148
See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 126, at 512 13 (“[C]ourts [have] held prior consistent
statements inadmissible when offered during direct testimony, and admitted such statements only after
impeachment . . . .”).
149
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (“[I]f the opposite party wishes to
open the door for its admission in evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received
generally.”).
150
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
151
See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER ET AL., EVIDENCE PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 1.14, at 51
(4th ed. 2012) (“Out-of-court statements may be admitted for many limited purposes even if the
hearsay doctrine would block their use to prove what they assert.”).
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152

witnesses. Only prior inconsistent statements that were made under oath
and in a prior trial, hearing, deposition or other proceeding may be
admitted for their truth.153 Of course, any prior inconsistent statement
made by a testifying witness in any context may be used for the limited
purpose of impeaching the witness’s testimony.154 To discredit the
witness, the prior inconsistency need not be “true,” however. The fact that
a witness made a statement that differs from her trial version demonstrates
vacillation that may lead the fact-finder to question credibility regardless of
which version is accurate.155 Limited non-hearsay use of prior inconsistent
statements outside the Rule 801(d)(1)(A) requirements necessitates a
limiting instruction to the fact-finder cautioning against substantive
In the arena of prior
consideration of the prior statement.156
inconsistencies, therefore, it is textbook evidence law that some may be
used for their truth, while others may be used for their limited non-hearsay
impeachment value only.157
There is a very logical basis for distinguishing among different prior
inconsistent statements made by testifying witnesses, however. First, these
out-of-court statements are by definition inconsistent with trial
testimony—meaning that they conflict with what the witness testified to
under oath before the jury. To allow the jury to utilize such out-of-court
inconsistencies for their truth is to permit the jury to reject the live
testimony, currently being offered by the witness under oath and subject to
penalty of perjury, in favor of a contradictory version provided at some
other time. Before allowing the rejection of trial evidence in favor of
hearsay, the Rules demand some guarantee that the prior statement is
sufficiently reliable to be afforded such treatment.158 Thus, the oath and
prior proceeding requirements for the substantive use of prior
inconsistencies are designed to provide some assurance that the out-ofcourt version is especially worthy of belief.159 This special reliability
152

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
Id. This hearsay exemption also requires that the declarant testify at trial and be subject to
cross examination about the prior statement. Id.
154
See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-29 (noting that prior inconsistencies that do not
meet the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) “may be used only for impeachment purposes”).
155
See id. at 801-28 (noting value of prior inconsistencies to test witness credibility without
regard to truth).
156
See id. at 801-29 (“[T]he nonoffering party is entitled to a limiting instruction that the
statement is to be used only for impeachment purposes.”).
157
Id.
158
See id. at 801-28 (noting congressional concern over reliability of prior inconsistencies
afforded substantive use).
159
See id. (explaining that Rule 801(d)(1)(A) represents a “compromise” between the Advisory
Committee’s liberal approach to the admission of prior witness statements and the restrictive approach
espoused by the House of Representatives); see also id. at 801-32 (“Because the party offering an
inconsistent statement as substantive evidence wants the trier of fact to accept it as true, and in
153
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concern inherent in the substantive use of inconsistencies rationally
justifies disparate treatment of prior inconsistent statements made in
different contexts. Additionally, a limiting instruction cautioning jurors to
disregard the truth of a prior inconsistent statement is likely to make sense
where jurors are asked to disregard an out-of-court statement that
substantively conflicts with the trial testimony. Where a witness gives
conflicting versions of events, lay jurors may readily comprehend a
command to disregard one version due to its questionable reliability.
Where the stated policies supporting substantive use of prior
consistencies under existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B) apply equally to all prior
consistencies admitted to rehabilitate, there is no rational basis for the
hearsay/non-hearsay distinction currently being drawn under the Rule.
Furthermore, the fact that the hearsay statements at issue are consistent
with previous trial testimony sets the stage for a uniquely
incomprehensible limiting instruction to the jury. Without a hearsay
exception, jurors must be told to use a prior consistent statement to
evaluate the “credibility” of the witness’s trial testimony only, but not to
accept the out-of-court statement as true.160 But, if jurors decide to believe
or “credit” the testifying witness—in part because of the existence of the
prior consistent statement—jurors are, in essence, accepting the “truth” of
the out-of-court statement as well, because it matches the trial testimony.
A lay jury may well be confused as to what use to make of the statement if
they are prohibited from “accepting” its substance.161 Indeed, eighty-four
percent of surveyed federal district judges agreed that the limiting
instructions accompanying prior consistent statements that fall outside of
existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B) are difficult for jurors to follow.162
The incoherence of the limiting instruction accompanying a prior
consistency admitted for its non-hearsay purpose is not an indictment of
limiting instructions generally. Noted evidence scholar, Professor David
Sklansky, recently examined the efficacy of limiting and other evidentiary
instructions, concluding that some instructions work better than others and
calling for a “context-specific weighing of the likelihood that an

preference to trial testimony, arguably greater circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness should be
required than in the case of consistent statements.”).
160
See id. at 801-38 (“Where a consistent statement is admissible for other, rehabilitative
purposes such as to explain an inconsistency, and yet is not admissible as substantive evidence under
Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the adversary is entitled to a limiting instruction as to the appropriate use of the
evidence.”).
161
See PARK ET AL., supra note 11, at 270 (noting that rehabilitative use of a prior consistent
statement “can lead to a truly unintelligible limiting instruction”); SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at
801-38 (remarking that limiting instructions to disregard consistent witness statements are “unlikely to
be understood by a jury”).
162
FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 2.
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163

evidentiary instruction will work and the costs of it failing.”
Professor
Sklansky observed that limiting instructions given in mock juror
experiments appear to function better when jurors are given an explanation
or basis for the limitation that they can comprehend—such as that hearsay
evidence is not “reliable.”164 He opined: “[I]f we cannot come up with an
explanation for the instruction that will make sense to jurors[,] [t]hen it
may be a good time to reexamine the rule that the instruction attempts to
implement.”165
Professor Sklansky’s analysis highlights the shortcomings in the
limiting instructions required under existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B). When
evaluated in context, it is apparent that jurors will have difficulty
comprehending why they must disregard the substance of a statement that
merely echoes trial testimony they are told to consider. In the unique
circumstance of the prior consistent statement, telling jurors that the outof-court statement is “unreliable” could undercut its very purpose in
repairing the credibility of the witness and confuse jurors as to the
appropriate use they are to make of the consistent statement. Without a
rational explanation, the limiting instruction is likely to be ineffective.
Crafting a more comprehensible instruction in this area has proved elusive.
Therefore, reconsideration of the hearsay rule that necessitates the
limiting instruction is in order. If the jury’s consideration of the prior
consistency presented a significant risk to a fair trial outcome, an
appropriate remedy would be to exclude the prior consistency altogether—
even for rehabilitative purposes.166 Because the out-of-court statement is,
by definition, consistent with testimony given at trial by the witness subject
to cross-examination, there appears to be little cost to the trial process if
the limiting instruction fails. In this context, therefore, permitting full use
of all admitted prior consistencies would be a superior change in the
operation of the Rules that would eliminate altogether the need for an
ineffective and confusing jury instruction.
Thus, the disparate treatment of similarly situated prior consistent
statements is not simply an example of the traditional limited admissibility
of some out-of-court statements. In seeking a rational and uniform
163
Sklansky, supra note 25, at 446; see id. at 429 (“Sometimes evidentiary instructions work,
sometimes they fail, and sometimes they backfire. Sometimes the effectiveness of the instruction
depends on the seriousness of the charge; sometimes it depends on the personality of the jurors;
sometimes it depends on how much stress is put on the instruction or what kind of stress; and
sometimes none of that seems to matter.”).
164
See id. at 438 (“Clearly, jurors respond to specific information they can understand and
appreciate.” (quoting Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to
Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 486 (2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
165
Id. at 447.
166
See id. at 444 (“If we thought jurors could not or would not follow [the limiting] instruction,
we would have to choose between either excluding the evidence or admitting it for all purposes.”).
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approach to the admissibility of prior consistent statements, the proposed
amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) promotes an important and laudable
objective. Of course, the entire purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence
is to encourage a trial process driven by logic and fairness.167 Rules that
draw illogical or even arbitrary distinctions create confusion among judges,
litigants, and jurors. The proposal to amend Rule 801(d)(1)(B) nicely
aligns with a model of clear and consistent rule-making and, as suggested
by an early draft of a proposed Advisory Committee Note, merely “extends
the argument made in the original Advisory Committee Note to its logical
conclusion.”168
B. Lost in Translation: Theory vs. Practice
Notwithstanding the policy justifications for the amendment, there has
been significant concern that an amendment would pave the way for
unfettered use of pre-trial witness statements as evidence.169 In theory, the
proposed amendment should not increase the number of prior consistent
statements admitted at trial.170 This is because the prior consistent
statements it covers—those that repair attacks on a testifying witness’s
memory or inconsistency—are admissible under currently existing rules,
albeit for their limited rehabilitative purpose.171 As a result of the
amendment, these already admissible prior consistent statements will
simply be put to greater use as substantive evidence. Accordingly, the
amendment should not alter the volume of prior consistent statements
being admitted at trial under existing rules. Viewed in this light, the
proposed amendment could be expected to have little negative impact on
trial proceedings.172
Critics of the proposed amendment reject this vision of its impact on
the trial process as overly simplistic and unrealistic. Opponents of the
proposed amendment predict that its adoption will open the floodgates to
admitting prior consistencies—which are not currently admitted—for any
purpose at all.173 Indeed, federal district judges overwhelmingly predicted
an increase in the admission of prior consistent statements under an
amended Rule.174 There are two principal reasons why this might be the
167

See FED. R. EVID. 102 (outlining the purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 128, at 218.
169
See supra notes 138–140 and accompanying text.
170
See Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 833 (“The amendment does not
make any consistent statement admissible that was not admissible previously . . . .”).
171
Id.
172
The biggest impacts the amendment would have under this view would be the positive ones of
eliminating confusing and possibly misleading limiting instructions and allowing appellate scrutiny of
admitted prior consistencies.
173
See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text.
174
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
168
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case, one pragmatic and the other theoretical.
1. The Amended Rule in the Courtroom
The pragmatic reason for possible increased admission of prior
consistent witness statements at trial stems from increased litigant reliance
on prior consistencies following the amendment. Litigants may have
neglected to proffer admissible prior consistencies under the existing
Rule,175 but may be motivated to do so under an amended version. While
litigants may appreciate the admissibility of prior consistent statements
offered to repair attacks on memory and consistency under the existing
rules, litigants also must realize that they are only admissible for their nonhearsay purpose. Without the ability to argue the truth of such admitted
prior consistent statements and recognizing that they must be accompanied
by cumbersome limiting instructions, lawyers may conclude that these
non-hearsay prior consistent statements are not worth the effort. In the
event of an amendment that affords substantive use to these prior
consistent statements and permits a closing argument based upon their
truth, prior consistent witness statements in these categories may become
more attractive to litigants and may be proffered far more often. Under
this scenario, an amendment could do much more than afford substantive
effect to statements already being published to juries under existing rules;
it may increase drastically the number of prior consistent statements
offered at trial.176
The theoretical response to this potential for more aggressive use of
prior consistencies is that well-established limitations, outside of hearsay
doctrine, govern the trial judge’s decision about proper rehabilitation. As
described above, use of a prior consistent statement must follow an
impeaching attack on the witness and the prior consistency must repair the
attack launched.177 Neither of these fundamental rehabilitation principles
would be disturbed by an amended Rule. Indeed, the proposed Advisory
Committee Note to the amendment very strongly emphasizes the continued
applicability of these common law limitations on rehabilitation.178 While
an amendment certainly could encourage party attempts to use prior
consistencies more often, trial judges would retain full control over the
decision about rehabilitation (which triggers substantive use under the
175
See id. at 3 (presenting the comment of one district judge who indicated that the issue of
limited admissibility of prior consistent statements had not come up once in seventeen years of trying
federal cases).
176
This could be one reason that district judges predicted an increase in admission of prior
consistent statements.
177
See supra notes 31, 33 and accompanying text.
178
See Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 833 (“As before, prior consistent
statements under the amendment may be brought before the factfinder only if they properly rehabilitate
a witness whose credibility has been attacked.”).
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proposal).
If the newly proffered prior consistent statements properly repair
impeachment of a witness, they should be admitted, in which case there is
little harm in allowing them to be used for their truth as well. This is the
point of the amendment.
If, on the other hand, lawyers begin
indiscriminately offering prior consistent statements that fail to rehabilitate
properly and simply attempt to bolster witnesses and build cases from
prepared out-of-court statements, opponents may object that those prior
consistent statements have little or no tendency to repair the impeachment
and should be excluded altogether. Even if proffered prior consistencies
have some slight rehabilitative value, litigants may argue that such value is
substantially outweighed by their tendency to add additional hearsay
information to the proponent’s case. To be sure, this process will demand
vigilance by opponents of prior consistent statements and active oversight
by trial judges.179 Although this may be viewed as burdensome for trial
judges, it represents no change from existing practice: The Federal Rules
of Evidence currently leave rehabilitation questions to development by
judges on a case-by-case basis.180 Therefore, interpreted as intended, the
proposed amendment does not pave the way for indiscriminate use of pretrial witness statements even if litigants proffer them with more frequency.
However, it is important to place the theory behind the proposed
amendment within the courtroom context in which it will play its part.
Significantly, surveyed federal district judges, who will be responsible for
policing an amended Rule, have predicted that trial judges will allow many
more prior consistent statements to be admitted in the wake of the
amendment.181 A philosophical shift in the approach to prior consistent
statements in the courtroom since the enactment of the Rules and the Tome
decision may impair judicial efforts to combat any onslaught of proffered
prior consistencies in the wake of an amendment.
2. The Philosophical Clash with Tome
When Rule 801(d)(1)(B) was enacted, it entered a common law trial
landscape in which prior consistent statements were admissible only for
their non-hearsay rehabilitative purpose.182 In this litigation climate,
judges and lawyers were required to discern and articulate the non-hearsay
purpose for admitting any prior consistency. The proposed amendment
179
See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 9 (noting that because “the amendment ties admissibility to
the need for rehabilitation, . . . [which] all witnesses need . . . to some degree” and consequently shifts a
trial judge’s focus to “tricky” 403 issues about the “credibility and weighing [of] the evidence,” trial
judges will inherit enhanced duties on the use of prior consistent statements in court).
180
Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 833.
181
See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 14 (noting that only thirty-five percent of surveyed judges
thought that trial judges would or could stem the flow of prior consistencies into evidence).
182
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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currently under review would enter a very different trial landscape that has
evolved since the enactment of the Rules in 1975 and the Tome decision in
1995. In the post-Rules universe, judges and lawyers are accustomed to
looking at Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to determine admissibility of prior
consistencies.
Accordingly, the independent focus on non-hearsay
rehabilitation purposes for prior consistent statements has likely
diminished since the door to substantive use was opened through Rule
801(d)(1)(B).183 This philosophical shift in the approach to prior consistent
statements under the Rules and Tome may make it difficult for litigants and
judges to police any significant uptick in the use of prior consistent
statements effectively following an amendment to the Rule.
Viewing the proposed amendment through the lens of current practice
under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), there is genuine reason to fear that it may not be
applied as intended. In the fast-paced context of a jury trial, many lawyers
and judges may fail to recognize the somewhat nuanced interaction
between rehabilitation and hearsay embodied in the amendment. Litigants
may ignore the two-step process that governs the substantive use of prior
consistent statements under the amendment and may assume that Rule
801(d)(1)(B) represents a proxy for prior consistent statement admission.
In other words, litigants might conclude that a prior consistent statement
may be admitted and used substantively whenever it “fits” the amended
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) language without further inquiry regarding the specific
impeachment launched or the relevance of the proffered consistency to
repair.
This tendency may be exacerbated by the traditional approach to
hearsay exceptions and exemptions in the courtroom. Once litigants
identify a hearsay exception applicable to a particular out-of-court
statement, they may naturally skip any analysis of the potential limited
non-hearsay use of such a statement. For example, if a declarant expressed
her then-existing state of mind out of court and that state of mind became
relevant in a subsequent trial, a lawyer would likely argue that the Rule
803(3) hearsay exception provides for the admission of the statement.184
Knowing there is an available hearsay exception that paves the way to
admit the statement for its truth, an advocate need not undertake a careful
analysis of whether the statement could be admitted for its limited non-

183
See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 19 (“[I]t opens the door to argument[s] about when a
witness’s credibility has been challenged rather than specifying what type of challenge triggers the use
of the prior statement[s].”); id. (“I have a concern with the proposed amendment because I do not know
what is meant by the words ‘otherwise admissible.’ . . . I would better understand the proposed
amendment if the words . . . were changed to ‘offered.’”); id. (“What does ‘otherwise admissible’ to
rehabilitate mean?”).
184
See FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (providing a hearsay exception for statements of declarant’s thenexisting state of mind).
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hearsay value in demonstrating circumstantial evidence of the declarant’s
state of mind.
Under the proposed hearsay exemption embodied in amended Rule
801(d)(1)(B), however, there remains an assumption that prior consistent
witness statements are inadmissible hearsay. That is, proponents must
identify a valid non-hearsay purpose for admission of a prior consistent
statement. Only if the out-of-court statement could be admitted for a
limited purpose does the amended Rule permit substantive use.185 Lawyers
and judges might mistakenly interpret an amended Rule 801(d)(1)(B) in
traditional fashion, however, and conclude that there is no need for a
thoughtful evaluation of the non-hearsay value of a prior consistent
statement now that an exemption paves the way for substantive use.
Indeed, comments made in the course of the Federal Judicial Center survey
reflect such misunderstanding.186 If the proposed amendment ultimately
takes effect, it will be the only hearsay exception or exemption that
requires independent consideration of the non-hearsay value of a statement
as the exclusive condition precedent to substantive availability.187 As the
lone exemption with such operation, the proposed amendment to Rule
801(d)(1)(B) risks misapplication. As currently configured, the amended
Rule could be interpreted to bless and automatically admit any prior
consistent statement offered to repair an impeaching attack.
This view of the Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is not simply the result of lawyer
ignorance: the Supreme Court’s decision in Tome may have much to do
with creating it. By mandating a premotive requirement in the hearsay
Rule, the Supreme Court suggested that the hearsay exemption does
regulate proper rehabilitation.188 Consequently, lawyers and judges alike
may have adopted the view that a prior consistent statement is (1)
admissible and (2) available for substantive use whenever it fits the
language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Indeed, this is true of the existing Rule. If
the specific impeaching attack of recent fabrication or improper influence
or motive outlined in the current Rule is made and the proffered prior
statement is both consistent with the witness’s trial testimony and a
185
See Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 832–33 (“The amendment does not
change the traditional and well-accepted limits on bringing prior consistent statements before the
factfinder for credibility purposes.”).
186
See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 5 (“If it is not hearsay, why is a limiting instruction being
given?”); id. at 15 (“If the statements would be admissible for substantive purposes, what would be the
source of the unfair prejudice that would support a ruling to exclude the evidence under Rule 403?”).
187
Although Rule 801(d)(1)(A) demands “inconsistency” for a prior witness statement that is
crucial to non-hearsay impeachment value, substantive availability ultimately turns on the context of
the out-of-court statement. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) (requiring that an inconsistent statement be
made under oath and at a prior trial, hearing, deposition, or other proceeding for substantive
availability).
188
See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (holding that the hearsay exemption
requires premotive statements for proper rehabilitation).
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premotive statement, it will satisfy both rehabilitation concerns and
hearsay concerns and be admitted for its truth. All of the components of
admissibility for rehabilitative purposes and substantive use are embodied
in that single self-contained provision. Therefore, practice under the
existing Rule may have evolved into a one-step analysis focused entirely
on Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and neglecting any independent assessment of
rehabilitative value. In other words, many lawyers and judges may use
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) as a simple shorthand for appropriate rehabilitation with
prior consistent statements, offering and allowing statements that fall
within the confines of the Rule and ignoring those that do not.189
Transferring this interpretation of existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to the
proposed amendment could lead to the more frequent admission of prior
consistent statements decried by critics. All prior consistent statements
proffered after any impeaching attack on a witness not within the original
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) category could be seen as automatically (1) admissible
to rehabilitate and (2) available for substantive use under the Rule.
Notwithstanding the cautionary statements in the proposed commentary
regarding appropriate rehabilitation, litigants may be lulled into a false
sense of security that the rehabilitation requirement is automatically
satisfied for any prior consistent statement falling within the amended
Rule.190
First, while the amended provision is premised upon the original twostep analysis behind the hearsay exemption that allows substantive use of
statements already admissible to rehabilitate, it preserves the wellrecognized Tome category in its first clause and expressly ratifies the Tome
premotive requirement in the proposed Advisory Committee Note.191 This
adoption of Tome may signal acceptance of the Tome philosophy that Rule
801(d)(1)(B) regulates the proper scope of rehabilitation, in addition to
hearsay. This philosophical bent could cause judges and litigants to
assume that the amendment also covers both issues of appropriate
rehabilitation and hearsay and to neglect a careful independent assessment
of the rehabilitation value of proffered prior consistent statements.
Second, the specific language chosen for the new clause of the
proposed amendment may exacerbate litigants’ tendency to presume that
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) defines allowable rehabilitation. The new clause
189
Indeed, several comments made by district judges in the FJC Survey reflect such a one-step
approach to prior consistencies. See, e.g., FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 9 (noting that the “current
language [of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)] places a governor on admissibility”); id. at 10 (opining that the
amendment creates a “new avenue of admissibility” for prior consistencies); id. at 15 (“If the
statements [are] admissible for substantive purposes [under the amendment], what would be the source
of the unfair prejudice that would support a ruling to exclude the evidence under Rule 403?”).
190
See Tome, 513 U.S. at 168 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[T]he
promulgated Rule says what it says, regardless of the intent of its drafters.”).
191
Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 832.
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provides that a statement is “not hearsay” if the declarant testifies at trial
subject to cross-examination and the statement is consistent with the
declarant’s testimony and “is offered . . . to rehabilitate the declarant’s
credibility as a witness when attacked on another ground.”192 This
language may signal that hearsay concerns disappear whenever a prior
consistent statement is “offered” to rehabilitate an impeached witness. So
interpreted, the Rule could be seen to bless the use of prior consistencies
both for repair and substance any time a witness is impeached on “another
ground” and the proponent of the witness “offers” a prior consistent
statement in an effort to “rehabilitate [the] declarant’s credibility as a
witness.”193 A proponent of a prior consistency need only explain that he
is “offering” the statement for repair following “impeachment” of his
witness to track the language of the amendment and argue for admission
and substantive use of the statement.
The key to proper application of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is careful
contextual evaluation of impeachment and proffered rehabilitation by the
trial judge in advance of consideration of substantive use of a prior
statement. Should trial judges neglect this contextual rehabilitation
analysis in favor of more rote admission under the proposed amendment,
some of the concerns expressed about expansive use of prior consistent
statements may be legitimate.
For example, trial judges may feel comfortable allowing prior
consistent statements to be admitted pursuant to subsection (ii) of the
proposed amendment whenever an opponent references a prior inconsistent
statement. Yet, it is not the case that all suggestions of a prior
inconsistency will be ameliorated by a prior consistency.194 If the prior
consistent statement was made at or near the time of the alleged
inconsistency, it may repair the attack by suggesting that the witness did
not vacillate and that the proffered inconsistency was never really
inconsistent after all.195 In that case, the prior consistent statement
rehabilitates and should be admitted and available for substantive use.196
Conversely, if the proponent of a witness seeks to counter an attack with a
prior inconsistent statement by demonstrating that the trial witness made a
statement consistent with trial testimony at some other time, this prior
consistent statement may not respond to the attack on the witness’s
constancy. The fact that the witness made statements in keeping with trial
192

May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 17, at 3 (emphasis added).
Judge Ericksen Comment, supra note 135, at 4.
194
See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 47, at 315–16 (noting that some inconsistencies “remain[]
despite all consistent statements”).
195
Id. § 47, at 316.
196
See id. (asserting that certain circumstances may make prior consistent statements relevant to
rehabilitate the witness).
193
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testimony at some times does not undercut the impeaching sting of
vacillation demonstrated by inconsistencies at other times. Therefore, such
a prior consistent statement does not rehabilitate the attack and should not
be admitted for repair purposes or substantively. There is a legitimate
concern, however, that litigants and trial judges will presume automatic
admissibility of witness prior consistent statements after an attack with a
prior inconsistent statement should an amendment provide that prior
consistent statements are not hearsay when they “are offered to
rehabilitate” after the witness is “attacked on another ground.”197
In essence, the amended Rule as it is currently configured presents
something of a mixed metaphor. Its first clause arises out of the post-Tome
era in which Rule 801(d)(1)(B) addresses appropriate rehabilitation and
hearsay in one efficient package.198 Without any express signaling in the
text of the amendment, the newly added clause harkens back to common
law practice, providing a hearsay exemption but outsourcing the decision
about proper rehabilitation to a case-by-case analysis by the trial judge.199
There is a real risk that litigants and judges accustomed to operating in the
post-Tome universe will construe the amended portion of the Rule
consistently with its predecessor and fail to focus on the limited reach of
the amendment. Judges and lawyers using Rule 801(d)(1)(B) on a onestop shopping basis may ignore the contextual threshold inquiry into
appropriate rehabilitation that must be performed in applying the second
clause of the amended Rule.200 If they do, all prior consistent statements
“offered to rehabilitate” a trial witness who has been impeached on any
ground (other than recent fabrication or improper influence or motive) will
be both admissible and available for substantive use. Such a construction
of the amendment could lead to the liberal and somewhat routine
admission of witness statements feared by critics, especially if litigants
aggressively seek admission of prior consistencies in the wake of the
amendment.
With sound evidentiary policy behind it, the proposed amendment
represents an opportunity to bring needed clarity and consistency to the
197

May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 17, at 3.
See Judge Ericksen Comment, supra note 135, at 3 (referring to the Tome language in a prior
draft proposal as a “vestigial remnant” of the existing Rule).
199
Indeed, the amended provision appears to track the view of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) espoused by the
dissent in Tome. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 169 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]f
such a statement is admissible for a particular rehabilitative purpose . . . its proponent now may use it
substantively, for a hearsay purpose . . . .”).
200
To be sure, judges and litigants should appreciate that an item of evidence does not become
admissible simply because it is “not hearsay” as provided by Rule 801(d)(1)(B). All evidence must
meet the minimum threshold of relevance to be admissible. FED. R. EVID. 402. However, the
relevance standard sets a low bar to admissibility. See id. 401 (classifying as “relevant” all evidence
that has “any tendency” to make a “fact . . . of consequence . . . more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence”).
198
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law of prior consistent statements. Arriving on the scene in the post-Tome
Rules era, however, the amendment must conform its common law roots to
existing practice. As currently drafted, the amendment may prove to be
plagued by unintended misapplication. The current proposal, although
well-founded, threatens to squander a golden opportunity to achieve
consistency for prior consistent statements.
C. How to Solve a Problem like Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
The proposed amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) adopted by the
Advisory Committee is premised upon a logical and workable two-step
approach to rehabilitation and hearsay analysis that is traceable to common
law practice. That said, lawyers and judges accustomed to operating under
the existing regime may have difficulty adjusting to the modified scheme.
Relying on habitual practice under the existing Rule, litigants and judges
may not sift the wheat from the chaff aggressively in a post-amendment
universe. Thus, if the language chosen for the amendment is retained,
there may be an unintended increase in the admission of prior consistent
statements in practice.201 There are three potential methods for preventing
an influx of witness hearsay into the trial process through an amended Rule
801(d)(1)(B): (1) reject any amendment and preserve the existing Rule; (2)
repeal Rule 801(d)(1)(B) altogether and allow non-hearsay use of all prior
consistencies only; or (3) redraft the proposed amendment to minimize the
risk of misapplication.
1. Maintain the Status Quo
The path of least resistance would be to reject any amendment to Rule
801(d)(1)(B) and to leave practice under the Rule alone. Many voices
would certainly favor this approach. Indeed, there is something to be said
for the safety of the familiar. Altering long-standing evidence rules is a
risky proposition. Courts and litigants have many years of experience with
the current Rule and the Tome premotive analysis. Leaving the Rule
untouched eliminates concerns over the possibility for expanded use of
prior witness statements. Many of the judges surveyed by the Federal
Judicial Center made comments to the effect that the Rule should not be
“fixed” because it is not “broken.”202
The obvious drawback of this option is that it ignores the fact that the
existing Rule may be “broken” because it maintains a mysterious disparate
treatment for different types of prior consistent statements under the
201
While improvident admission could form the basis for an appeal, it would be preferable to fix
any foreseeable misinterpretation at the trial level rather than relying on the corrective of the appellate
process.
202
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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Evidence Rules. In addition, this approach would maintain the need for
complicated jury instructions of questionable utility. Indeed, the current
disparity in the treatment of different types of prior consistent statements
could pose a greater fairness risk to litigants than a Rule that treats all
admitted prior consistent statements similarly. Under the existing Rule, an
appellate court might find that a trial judge abused her discretion in
allowing a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate an impeaching attack,
thus erroneously giving the jury access to a witness’s prior consistent
statement. Upon a finding of error, an appellate court would review the
record to determine the effect of the erroneous admission on the
appellant’s trial outcome.
For an admitted prior consistent statement covered by existing Rule
801(d)(1)(B), an appellate court could find a harmful error requiring
reversal given that the jury was free to make substantive use of the
erroneously admitted prior consistency. For admitted prior consistencies
not covered by the current Rule, the trial judge will likely have given the
requisite limiting instruction, cautioning the jury against reliance on the
truth of the statement.203 Under these circumstances, it is likely that an
appellate court would find the admission of the prior consistent statement a
harmless error because of the protection provided by the limiting
instruction.204 Because of the presence of limiting instructions, therefore,
some litigants may be denied relief that would otherwise be forthcoming as
a result of improvident admission of a prior consistency. The Supreme
Court has recognized the reality that jurors may be unable to adhere to
limiting instructions in some circumstances due to the difficulty inherent in
ignoring or disregarding what has already been revealed.205 Jurors may
have proven incapable of disregarding the truth of the admitted prior
consistent statement and may have relied upon it in reaching a verdict.206
That verdict may remain unassailable due to the presence of the ignored
instruction. Therefore, the limiting instruction required by the current
203
See MUELLER ET AL., supra note 151, § 1.7, at 25 (“One common curative step is to instruct
the jury by limiting the purposes for which evidence may be considered, directing that it be
disregarded, or explaining it in other ways.”).
204
See id. (“Usually reviewing courts conclude that [limiting] instructions make any error in
admitting evidence harmless.”).
205
See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139 (1968) (“The fact of the matter is that too often
such admonition against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible
declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors.” (quoting Delli Paoli v. United States, 352
U.S. 232, 247 (1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
206
See Sklansky, supra note 25, at 456 (“[J]uries should never be presumed to follow instructions
that are incoherent or that are likely to appear senseless to them.”). Several district court judges
surveyed by the FJC commented that juries already use prior consistencies for their truth and disregard
any accompanying limiting instructions. See, e.g., FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 6 (“It is likely
evidence admitted at trial is weighed as being admitted for its truth even if a cautionary instruction is
given.”); id. (“[J]urors have already amended the rule.”).
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disparity in treatment between different prior consistent statements may be
serving to protect artificially erroneous admission of some prior consistent
statements from appellate review.207
It would be the unusual case in which admission of a prior statement
that was consistent with testimony given at trial would be an outcomealtering error.208 But Tome was just such a case. Admission of the child
victim’s prior consistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) constituted
harmful error in light of her stilted trial testimony.209 The admitted prior
consistencies were relied upon in closing arguments and clearly were
game-changing for the prosecution.210 Thus, the admission of those prior
consistencies for their truth justified reversal.
If the defense had chosen to attack the victim’s memory instead of her
motivations, it could have suggested that she could no longer recall details
of alleged activity that took place when she was only four years old. In
response to this impeaching attack, the victim’s prior consistencies that
were made much closer to the alleged assaults may have been appropriate
rehabilitation. If admitted in response to an attack on memory, however,
the victim’s prior consistent statements could not have been used for their
truth under the current Rule and would have to be accompanied by an
appropriate limiting instruction. If the jury had nonetheless convicted the
defendant, even erroneous admission of these prior consistencies would be
unlikely to lead to reversal due to the cautionary limiting instructions given
to the jury. Although it might be just as probable that the jury relied upon
the victim’s hearsay to convict, the non-hearsay purpose for the admission
would likely insulate the conviction from reversal. Using the Tome facts
as an example illustrates the potential unfairness caused by differential
treatment of similarly situated prior consistencies.
With an amended Rule that allows all admitted prior consistencies to
be used for their truth without any limiting instruction, appellate courts
207
See Kirkpatrick, supra note 120, at 43 (noting that the proposed amendment would make “a
finding of harmless error more difficult” because all admitted consistent statements would “become
substantive evidence”); see also Sklansky, supra note 25, at 443 (“In some cases, though, the
admission of certain evidence before the jury would be deemed prejudicial error in the absence of a
curative instruction. If we stopped presuming that evidentiary instructions worked and instead
presumed that they did not work, those would be cases in which the judge would have to declare a
mistrial and try the case anew.”).
208
See GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 7012, at 154 (“[S]ince the prior consistent statement is by its
very nature consistent with in court testimony of the witness, introduction of reversible error through
misinterpretation is very unlikely.”); SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-32 (“[A]n error in either
admitting or excluding a statement for its truth under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is more likely, though not
certain, to be harmless.”).
209
See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1995) (holding that the trial judge abused
his discretion by admitting prior consistent statements).
210
Case Comment, Evidence––The Common-Law Premotive Rule Regains Momentum in the
Federal Rules of Evidence––Tome v. United States, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1219, 1224 n.32 (1995).
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would be forced to take a closer look at those admitted prior consistencies
and police improvident admissions evenly.211
For these reasons,
abandoning any attempt at amending the Rule and maintaining the status
quo may not be an optimal solution. Finally, a decision to maintain a
conceptually irrational disconnect between similarly situated prior
consistent statements due to fear of the unknown threatens to elevate
“safety” over rational rule-making.
One of the most compelling arguments for keeping the current version
of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is that it provides a powerful “bright-line” standard
that creates certainty for litigants and prevents trial judges from liberally
admitting prior consistencies.212 The protection provided by the existing
Rule is somewhat illusory, however, and fails to provide a compelling
justification for maintaining the status quo. First, while the existing Rule
may constitute a bright-line standard that absolutely prohibits the
substantive use of prior consistencies outside of its purview, administering
the standard already demands significant judicial discretion. Trial judges
must ascertain whether an appropriate charge of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive has been made.213 Because such a charge
need not be express, determining whether an implied charge has been
levied is a necessarily contextual task requiring judicial assessment of
Furthermore,
impeachment techniques on a case-by-case basis.214
determining whether a prior consistent statement was made prior to the
charged motive or influence requires a determination as to when in the
chronology of the case the motive arose. Although the impeaching attack
may make this apparent in some circumstances, analysis of the timing may
be less clear in other cases.215 Trial judges necessarily enjoy significant
discretion in administering the existing Rule.
Second, trial judges already possess the power to admit prior
consistencies outside the scope of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) if they are
appropriately rehabilitative.216 Of course, these prior consistent statements
may be admitted only for their non-hearsay purpose. Still, they may be
211

See Kirkpatrick, supra note 120, at 43 (noting a “possibility of increased reversals”).
See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 9 (noting that the “current language [of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)]
places a governor on admissibility”); see also SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-37 (“The risk
of an unbridled use of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is . . . that the Trial Court may play fast and loose with
principles of relevance, shifting the trial from a focus on in-court to out-of-court statements.”); Bullock
& Gardner, supra note 126, at 537 (“An argument can be made that anything but a time-line rule leaves
some uncertainty in the parties’ pre-trial preparation.”).
213
MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 47, at 316.
214
See id. (“It is up to the judge to decide whether the impeachment at least implies a charge of
contrivance.”).
215
See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 126, at 537 (“The parties cannot know exactly how the
court will rule in regard to relevancy or the premotive or postmotive status of a prior consistent
statement.”).
216
MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 47, at 318.
212
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published to the fact-finder and trial judges must be trusted to assess which
prior consistent statements properly rehabilitate using flexible standards of
relevance and probative value.217
Finally, to suggest that trial judges need bright-line standards to cabin
rehabilitation fairly is to reject the decision by the drafters of the Federal
Rules of Evidence to leave significant areas of impeachment and
rehabilitation to continued case-by-case development.218 In theory,
specific rules governing appropriate rehabilitation could make life easier
and more predictable for trial judges and litigants. But drafting specific
rules of rehabilitation to cover every possible scenario that might arise at
trial would be an exercise in futility. Like general notions of relevance,
many issues regarding proper impeachment and rehabilitation are best left
to flexible contextual decision-making.219 For all of these reasons,
preserving existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B) as a bright line limitation to prevent
discretionary judicial consideration of the appropriate use of prior
consistencies appears ill-advised.
2. Back to the Future: Consistency Through Repeal of Rule
801(d)(1)(B).
There is, of course, another way of achieving consistency between
prior consistent statements without risking liberal admission of prior
witness consistencies. Although likely to be a political non-starter, the
Advisory Committee could achieve logical consistency by eliminating the
hearsay exemption provided by Rule 801(d)(1)(B) altogether, relegating all
prior consistent statements solely to rehabilitative use.220 Indeed, if the
fundamental significance of such witness consistencies stems from their
rehabilitative value, it makes sense to confine the use of all such statements
to that fundamental purpose. With a repeal of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the trial
judge would be charged with determining the rehabilitative value of a
proffered prior consistent statement and could allow its admission for nonhearsay credibility purposes alone. Limited admissibility would require an
instruction cautioning the fact-finder against substantive use of the prior
consistent statement in all cases. This would restore logic to the Rules and
217
See id. (“[T]he judge has discretion under Rules 401 and 403 to determine whether the
particular circumstances justify admission of consistent statements to rehabilitate the witness.”).
218
See supra notes 45–46, 51 and accompanying text.
219
See MUELLER ET AL., supra note 151, at 161 n.7 (explaining that the “‘variety of relevancy
problems is coextensive with the ingenuity of counsel in using circumstantial evidence as a means of
proof’ and that an ‘enormous number of cases fall in no set pattern,’ and therefore Rule 401 is intended
only ‘as a guide for handling them’” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note)).
220
Illinois has maintained this common law approach even after the enactment of Rule
801(d)(1)(B) in the federal system. See People v. Lambert, 681 N.E.2d 675, 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)
(“Illinois follows the common-law rule that, where admission is allowed, a prior consistent statement is
permitted solely for rehabilitative purposes and not as substantive evidence.”).
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case law by treating similarly situated prior consistent statements
consistently—none would be available for their truth.221
Such a solution runs counter to the policy espoused by the current
Rule, which explains that there is “no sound reason” to restrict substantive
use of such admitted consistent statements, however.222 To support
elimination of the hearsay exemption that has existed since 1975, there
must indeed be some good reason for such a change in course and
limitation on the use of prior consistent statements. Whether or not there is
such a reason may depend on one’s view of the efficacy of limiting
instructions. To the extent that jurors can be relied upon to comprehend
and adhere to such instructions, eliminating substantive availability of prior
consistent statements may make sense.223 Proponents of a witness will
have access to all such consistencies to the extent that they have
rehabilitative value, but will always be forced to build a case from the
witness’s live testimony.
But skeptics have long questioned jurors’ ability to ignore information
Indeed, the Supreme Court has
they have already received.224
acknowledged the failings of limiting instructions in certain contexts.225
Several of the district court judges surveyed regarding the proposed
amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) commented that jurors ignore such
instructions and rely on prior consistencies substantively, notwithstanding
warnings to the contrary.226 If jurors ignore instructions limiting the use of
prior consistent statements to their rehabilitative purposes—willfully,
unconsciously, or from a lack of comprehension—they may utilize those
prior consistent statements substantively for their truth. If this happens, the
prejudiced party is unlikely to have any recourse due to the appellate

221
Of course, if a prior consistent statement by a trial witness satisfied a separate exception to the
hearsay rule, it could be substantively admissible through that exception without regard to its
rehabilitative value. FED. R. EVID. 802.
222
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note.
223
Of course, the American trial system depends upon the premise that juries comprehend and
follow instructions provided to them. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (“Unless
we proceed on the basis that the jury will follow the court’s instructions where those instructions are
clear and the circumstances are such that the jury can reasonably be expected to follow them, the jury
system makes little sense.” (quoting Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 242 (1957)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
224
See Sklansky, supra note 25, at 410–13 (describing the legal community’s long-standing belief
that lay jurors are incapable of following limiting and other evidentiary instructions).
225
See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 129 (“The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome
by instructions to the jury all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.” (quoting Krulewitch
v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933) (observing that the admission of evidence
for a limited purpose can be problematic for a jury and commenting that “[d]iscrimination so subtle is a
feat beyond the compass of ordinary minds”).
226
FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 3.
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practice of finding limiting instructions curative.
Therefore, the
existence of limiting instructions could insulate improvident use of prior
consistent statements from review under a version of the Rules that rejects
substantive use of prior consistent statements altogether.
Although treating all prior consistencies similarly on its face, such a
rule could create more disparity and unpredictability in the treatment of
prior consistent statements below the surface. Parties would continue to
depend upon the trial judge’s assessment of the rehabilitative value of prior
consistent statements to determine which will be admitted, but will have no
way of knowing when the fact-finder will disregard the limiting instruction
and when it will adhere to it. Under this scenario, some prior consistent
statements will in fact be used for their truth and others will not, but
litigants will have no method for discerning the difference because it will
be hidden through the use of limiting instructions.
If there is legitimate reason to fear a jury’s disregard of a limiting
instruction, bringing logical consistency to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) by
expanding it to all rehabilitative prior consistent statements may be the
better course.228 In that case, all prior consistent statements admitted to
rehabilitate legitimately will be available substantively to the fact-finder.
If such substantive use of a prior consistent statement is improper in a
particular case under standards of appropriate rehabilitation, the aggrieved
party can obtain appellate review of the admission decision based upon the
reality that the statement was considered substantively, rather than have
that appeal foreclosed by the fiction that the fact-finder dutifully complied
with a limiting instruction.
3. Preserving the Amendment and the Original Intent of Rule
801(d)(1)(B)
Each of the preceding avenues for eliminating concerns about the
proposed amendment throws the baby out with the bath water. Quashing
the amendment and retaining existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B) would maintain
an irrational status quo in the name of safety and out of fear of change.
The repeal of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) altogether would remove potentially
helpful evidence from the fact-finder, increase the use of confusing
limiting instructions at trial, and create unreviewable disparities in jury use
of prior consistencies.
The third possible approach to the mixed message of the current
proposal is to revise the amendment in an effort to define clearly in rule
text the analysis necessary for admission of prior consistent statements for
substantive purposes. Such a revision could provide judges and litigants
227

See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
See Sklansky, supra note 25, at 447 (noting that reconsideration of an evidence rule is
appropriate when judges cannot craft a limiting instruction that is likely to be understood by a lay jury).
228
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meaningful tools to prevent indiscriminate admission of all witness
consistencies.
Although there are undoubtedly numerous possible
revisions that could be undertaken, two seem most suited to achieving
greater consistency for prior consistent statements, while simultaneously
minimizing (if not eliminating entirely) concerns about expansive use of
witness statements.229 The first potential revision would preserve the twocategory approach of the current proposal, as well as the language of
original Rule 801(d)(1)(B). The second possible revision would be more
drastic, discarding the language of the original Rule in favor of a single
hearsay exemption applicable to all prior consistencies properly admitted
to rehabilitate any type of impeaching attack.
a. A Modest Revision
The first possible revision presents a modest change that would not
disturb practice under existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and would highlight the
proper analysis of the newly added provision for judges and lawyers.
Instead of suggesting that a prior consistency may come in whenever it is
“offered” to rehabilitate an impeached witness, an amendment could be
drafted to capture a threshold conclusion about limited rehabilitative use,
as follows:
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that
meets the following conditions is not hearsay:
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The declarant
testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior
statement, and the statement: . . .
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is
independently admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of:
(i) rebutting an express or implied charge that the declarant
recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper
influence or motive in so testifying; or
(ii) repairing another specific impeaching attack on the
declarant’s credibility as a witness; . . . .230
This draft offers several benefits. First, spelling out the threshold
inquiry into limited rehabilitative value in rule text may curb overly
aggressive resort to prior consistencies. Furthermore, highlighting the
rehabilitation question in rule text may arm opponents of a prior
consistency with the appropriate objection under the amendment. With
229
Indeed, some of the district judges surveyed about a proposed amendment offered redrafting
suggestions. See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 7 (“Maybe you could delete the language above,
‘whenever it would be otherwise admissible to’ and instead just say, ‘if it rehabilitates a witness.’”).
230
The emphases stress suggested language that differs from the proposed amendment.
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such a draft, opponents of prior consistencies would insist upon clear
articulation of the rehabilitative value of the proffered consistency. Judges
and lawyers would be certain to appreciate the unique operation of the
amended hearsay exemption, requiring a finding about limited non-hearsay
use before allowing substantive use of a prior consistency. Importantly, a
draft that emphasizes consideration of rehabilitation independently of
hearsay re-aligns the Rule with its common law antecedents and eliminates
the potential use of the Rule as a proxy for admission of prior
consistencies. Judges and litigants will not be lulled into thinking that any
prior consistent statement “offered” to rehabilitate becomes automatically
admissible for its truth, but instead will focus on the “specific impeaching
attack” and on the non-hearsay rehabilitative purpose for the proffered
prior consistency.
The last paragraph of the proposed Advisory Committee Note to the
current amendment clarifies that the Rule “does not make any consistent
statement admissible that was not admissible previously.”231 Still, it seems
important to make this point more overtly in Rule text. Although the
Advisory Committee Notes are widely recognized as authoritative for
proper rule interpretation,232 it is possible that judges and litigators could
miss the finer points buried in the notes in the heat of trial. Further, the
unusual focus on non-hearsay value under an amendment may demand
more overt explanation to avoid misapplication.
Finally, this draft would preserve Tome and existing practice by
maintaining its triggering language and via express language to that effect
in the proposed Advisory Committee Note.233 Thus, this version of an
amended Rule would not alter the way in which judges and lawyers
currently handle prior consistencies used to repair charges of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive. The preservation of Tome in
such a revision is also its biggest weakness. By maintaining Tome and the
premotive limitation, this draft would include provisions within the same
Rule embodying contradictory philosophies. The first clause of such a
draft would continue to occupy the field of rehabilitation and hearsay,
while the second clause would require a distinctly independent assessment
of the rehabilitative value of a particular proffered prior consistent
statement. Furthermore, like the proposed amendment, this version of the
Rule would fail to achieve true consistency for prior consistent statements
and would maintain the need for confusing limiting instructions in some
circumstances.
In Tome, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
231

Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 833.
See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160 (1995) (“We have relied on those wellconsidered [Advisory Committee] Notes as a useful guide in ascertaining the meaning of the Rules.”).
233
The current proposed advisory committee note expressly maintains the Tome premotive
requirement. Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 832.
232

2014]

SEEKING CONSISTENCY FOR PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS

985

postmotive statements could serve to rehabilitate charges of improper
motive or influence in some, albeit rare, circumstances.234 Under a version
of the amendment that retains Tome, therefore, some postmotive
statements could be admitted for their limited non-hearsay purpose even if
they are not admissible for their truth under the first clause of an amended
Rule 801(d)(1)(B), thus requiring limiting instructions for the jury in some
cases. Any draft that maintains Tome and its rigid rejection of postmotive
statements will fail to achieve genuine uniformity in the approach to prior
consistent statements. Maintaining Tome also could generate additional
interpretive problems requiring resolution by the courts. Although
generally recognized methods of impeachment do exist, actual impeaching
attacks in the courtroom often defy concrete categorization.235 Litigants
may dispute which of the two clauses in the amended Rule they are relying
upon in proffering a prior consistent statement. The overlapping nature of
impeaching attacks may make it difficult for the trial judge to regulate a
continuing premotive requirement in a post-amendment universe.
b. A Single Standard
For these reasons, an amendment that creates a single standard
applicable to all prior consistent statements promises to achieve the
greatest uniformity in the treatment of prior consistencies and is most
closely aligned with the policies outlined in the original Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Such an amendment would treat all
proffered prior consistencies similarly and would avoid the slippery task of
classifying or categorizing different breeds of impeachment and
rehabilitation.236 Importantly, the key feature of a single-standard
amendment would be a case-by-case inquiry into the threshold question of
rehabilitation as a condition precedent to use of prior consistencies for their
truth as a matter of hearsay doctrine.237
An amended Rule simply could provide for the substantive
admissibility of all prior consistent statements that have been evaluated as
properly admissible for the limited purpose of rehabilitating the declarant’s
234
See Tome, 513 U.S. at 158 (explaining that postmotive out-of-court consistent statements can
rebut a charge of fabrication or improper motive or influence in a less forceful way); see also Bullock
& Gardner, supra note 126, at 535–36 (detailing circumstances in which postmotive statements could
rehabilitate an impeached trial witness).
235
See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 47, at 316 (noting that an attack with a prior inconsistent
statement could be “interpretable as a charge of a recent plan or contrivance to give false testimony”).
236
See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-33 (noting that a single standard hearsay
exemption applicable to all prior consistencies admitted to rehabilitate would “make the Rule more
straightforward and simpler to apply in practice”).
237
A single standard option was the original proposal circulated to district court judges in
connection with the survey conducted by the Federal Judicial Center. See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18,
at 2 (displaying a single-standard proposal allowing consistent witness statements “otherwise
admissible to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness”).
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credibility as a witness, as follows:
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that
meets the following conditions is not hearsay:
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The declarant
testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior
statement, and the statement: . . .
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is
independently admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of
repairing a specific impeaching attack on the declarant’s
credibility as a witness; . . . .238
Such a rule would clarify that all prior consistent statements properly
admissible for limited rehabilitative purposes may be used substantively as
well. By making an express reference to the non-hearsay purpose for a
prior consistency, this draft prevents litigants from skipping straight to
substantive use of the statement as they may do under other hearsay
exceptions and exemptions. Language in the text of the rule focusing
judges and litigants on the fact that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) allows substantive
use of prior consistent statements only to the extent that they will already
be available to the fact-finder for their non-hearsay rehabilitation purpose
captures the intended operation of the amendment and may prevent the
expansive use feared by critics.
Importantly, this simple unitary standard for all proffered prior
consistencies would reflect a single philosophical approach to the
substantive use of witness consistencies. Regardless of the type of
impeachment launched, the hearsay rule would never control proper
rehabilitation: a trial judge would need to undertake an independent
assessment of proper rehabilitation in every case before affording
substantive use to a witness consistency. Indeed, this draft would focus
judges and lawyers on the common law rehabilitation analysis that
routinely was required prior to the adoption of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). In
contrast to the current proposal and consistent with the common law
practice upon which Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is premised, this rule would leave
to the trial judge entirely the question of which prior consistent statements
rehabilitate. Eliminating standards of proper rehabilitation from the
hearsay exemption altogether also aligns with the choice to avoid the
almost impossible task of regulating rehabilitation practices under the
Rules.239
An amendment with a single standard focused on admissibility for
rehabilitative purposes tracks the policies articulated in the Advisory
238
239

The emphasis stresses language that differs from the proposed amendment.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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Committee Note to original Rule 801(d)(1)(B) precisely. Those notes
provide that if a prior consistency is going to be admitted anyway because
the opponent opened the door to it with a particular impeaching technique,
the jury might as well be permitted to rely on the statement substantively
because it merely echoes previously received trial testimony.240 The key to
those notes, the independent admissibility of the prior consistency for
rehabilitation, is also the key to the operation of such a draft rule.
Unlike the proposed amendment adopted by the Advisory Committee
and the modest revision suggested above, this version of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
would truly “extend[] the argument made in the original Advisory
Committee Note to its logical conclusion” and achieve genuine consistency
for all prior consistent statements at trial.241 If a trial judge finds that a
witness’s prior consistency rehabilitates a specific impeaching attack,
regardless of the type of attack, the prior consistent statement will be
admissible to repair, as well as for its truth in all cases. Conversely, if a
trial judge finds that a prior consistency fails to repair a specific
impeaching attack on the declarant witness, it will be excluded entirely and
unavailable to the fact-finder for any purpose.242 Under a revision like this
one, prior consistencies offered to rehabilitate either will be admitted with
full use or excluded entirely. There would be no class of inferior prior
consistencies—available to repair if accompanied by a limiting instruction,
but not for their truth.243 Furthermore, all admitted prior consistencies
would be treated similarly on appeal because none would be accompanied
by the confusing limiting instruction that may or may not prevent the factfinder’s reliance on the admitted statement.
This single-standard proposal resembles the draft Rule originally
circulated to federal district judges in the Federal Judicial Center survey.
In that draft of the amendment, the Advisory Committee proposed a
provision allowing substantive use of all prior consistent statements
“otherwise admissible to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a
witness.”244 This originally proposed language also emphasized the
condition precedent to substantive use of a prior consistent statement—an
assessment of the statement’s rehabilitative qualities. However, some
federal district judges expressed confusion about the meaning of the

240
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (“The prior statement is consistent
with the testimony given on the stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for its
admission in evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received generally.”).
241
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 128, at 218.
242
It may, of course, be admissible through any other hearsay exceptions applicable to the
statement. See FED. R. EVID. 802 (stating that hearsay is inadmissible unless specifically provided for
by the rules).
243
See supra notes 6 7 and accompanying text.
244
FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 2.
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245

language “otherwise admissible.”
In order to focus judges and litigants
on the threshold rehabilitation inquiry necessary under the Rule, an
amendment that more explicitly mandates an “independent” finding of
“non-hearsay” rehabilitative value in the wake of an identified impeaching
attack may eliminate any potential confusion.
Therefore, a positive effect of a single-standard amendment would be
to bring logic, simplicity, and uniformity to the evaluation of prior
consistent statements. It would best capture the original purpose of the
Rule by emphasizing the trial judge’s independent rehabilitation
assessment as driving operation of the hearsay provision. On the negative
side, however, such an amendment would effectively overrule the hard and
fast Tome premotive standard and alter longstanding practice, to the extent
that trial judges could find some postmotive statements rehabilitative—at
least in rare cases.246 Of course, a major obstacle to an amendment like
this one would be the certain backlash against any attempt to dismantle the
well-established and rigid Tome premotive requirement.
To protect against such a backlash, the Advisory Committee Note to
such an amendment could reinforce Tome’s essential premise that
postmotive prior consistent statements rarely serve a rehabilitative purpose
that would justify admissibility.247 That truism notwithstanding, the
Advisory Committee Note could clarify the intent of the amendment to
leave proper rehabilitation to the independent discretion of the trial judge.
Thus, the Rule need not reject Tome’s emphasis on the importance of
timing in most circumstances, but may nonetheless clarify that the hearsay
rules are not designed to regulate proper rehabilitation.
While any amendment that eliminates Tome’s rigid approach to the
premotive limitation is certain to be controversial, rule-makers should
consider thoughtfully the merits and demerits of the rigid Tome rule in a
post-amendment universe. As described above, maintaining the rigid
requirement would defeat genuine consistency in the treatment of admitted
prior consistent statements and could generate interpretive disputes at trial.
In addition, the value of Tome may be diminished by an amendment to
Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Indeed, the Supreme Court found the premotive
requirement embedded in the Rule to explain the substantive availability of
only one type of prior consistent statement under existing Rule
801(d)(1)(B).248 As specifically explained by the Court: “If consistent
245

See id. at 19 (“What does ‘otherwise admissible’ to rehabilitate mean?”).
See Kirkpatrick, supra note 120, at 43 (noting that a proposed amendment like this one “would
now make [prior consistencies] substantive evidence, thus doing an end-run around the holding of
Tome”).
247
See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 126, at 537 (“It is important to note that in most cases,
postmotive prior consistent statements will be inadmissible under the relevancy rules for the reasons
originally noted by courts developing common-law evidentiary rules.”).
248
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 159 (1995).
246
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statements are admissible without reference to the timeframe we find
imbedded in the Rule, there appears no sound reason not to admit
consistent statements to rebut other forms of impeachment as well.”249
The Advisory Committee is currently considering expanding
substantive use of prior consistent statements to cover these other methods
of impeachment and rehabilitation. Should the Rule be expanded to
include all types of prior consistencies, the premotive requirement would
no longer be necessary to distinguish prior consistent statements that are
substantively available from those that are not.250
Indeed, the premotive requirement may not only be less necessary
under an amended Rule, but also inadequate to curb the improper use of
prior consistent statements feared by critics of the amendment. In Tome,
all of the young victim’s out-of-court statements accusing her father of
abuse were made after her parents’ divorce required her to spend time
alone in her father’s care.251 Where the defense’s cross-examination
implied that the victim’s story of abuse was designed to influence the
custody arrangement to allow her to stay with her mother, the victim’s
prior statements were all made after this alleged motive to fabricate
arose.252 On these facts, the Supreme Court used the premotive
requirement to exclude these powerful and damning hearsay statements by
the victim.
Close consideration of Tome suggests that while the premotive
requirement may have served its purpose on the facts of Tome, it may be
inadequate to protect against improvident use of hearsay in other cases.
Suppose the victim in Tome had made all of her powerful and damning
accusations of abuse before her parents’ divorce, perhaps precipitating it.
Under the analysis in Tome, the prosecutor would be permitted to use the
victim’s premotive consistent statements for their truth in response to
defense counsel’s questioning about the victim’s desire to return to her
249
Id.; see also SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-36 (“If the drafters of the Federal Rules
did not intend to impose a pre-motive requirement, then there would have been no need to carve out
those statements offered to rebut a charge of fabrication, motive, or influence for special substantive
treatment.”).
250
See Tome, 513 U.S. at 159 (“Whatever objections can be leveled against limiting the Rule to
this designated form of impeachment and confining the rebuttal to those statements made before the
fabrication or improper influence or motive arose, it is clear to us that the drafters of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
were relying upon the common-law temporal requirement.”); id. at 160 (“The language of the Rule, in
its concentration on rebutting charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive to the
exclusion of other forms of impeachment, as well as in its use of wording that follows the language of
the common-law cases, suggests that it was intended to carry over the common-law premotive rule.”
(emphasis added)); id. at 168 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[O]nly
the premotive-statement limitation makes it rational to admit a prior corroborating statement to rebut a
charge of recent fabrication or improper motive, but not to rebut a charge that the witness’ memory is
playing tricks.”).
251
Id. at 153 (majority opinion).
252
Id. at 155.
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mother’s custody. While satisfying the premotive requirement, such use of
victim hearsay appears inconsistent with the purposes of Rule
801(d)(1)(B).
Although the defense may have opened a door with its challenge to the
little girl’s motivations, the prior statements were anything but a mere
repetition of her trial testimony. Her stilted responses to leading questions
failed to paint a persuasive picture of abuse on the stand.253 To have
allowed her detailed out-of-court accusations would implicate the core
hearsay risk of substituting hearsay for trial testimony. Furthermore,
allowing such statements appears at odds with the policy underlying Rule
801(d)(1)(B) that takes a “why not?” approach to substantive use of prior
consistent statements because it assumes that the statements add nothing to
trial testimony, but merely echo it in a way that repairs an opponent’s
impeaching attack. The probative value of such premotive statements to
rehabilitate would be substantially outweighed by their tendency to add to
the prosecution’s case against Tome. Therefore, a premotive requirement
may not effectively prevent admission of hearsay like that at issue in Tome.
Rather, a cautious and thoughtful Rule 403 evaluation of prior witness
statements to weigh their rehabilitative value against their hearsay risk
holds far greater promise for protecting against misuse of Rule
801(d)(1)(B). The proposed Advisory Committee Note emphasizing the
importance of a Rule 403 analysis may be far more important in promoting
the intended use of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) than a strict premotive limitation.254
Even assuming that a rigid premotive requirement appears unnecessary
and inadequate, some may balk at any amendment that overturns a
standard set by the Supreme Court almost twenty years ago.255 While this
concern merits careful consideration, it is important to emphasize the basis
for the Tome holding. The majority in Tome discovered a premotive
requirement in the Rule after examining the Advisory Committee Note to
the original Rule and as a result of efforts to divine the intent of the
The premotive requirement resulted from the Court’s
drafters.256
253
See id. at 153 (“For the most part, [the victim’s] direct testimony consisted of one- and twoword answers to a series of leading questions.”).
254
See Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 833 (“[T]o be admissible for
rehabilitation, a prior consistent statement must satisfy the strictures of Rule 403.”).
255
See Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra, Philip Reed Professor of Law, Fordham Univ. Sch. of
Law, Reporter, to the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 19 (April 1, 2013), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Evidence/EV2013-05.pdf
(“If the Committee is of the view that the Tome pre-motive requirement should be rejected, then the
proposed amendment would need to be reconsidered on the merits and the Committee should resurrect
the initial draft of the proposed amendment . . . .”).
256
See Tome, 513 U.S. at 160 (“We have relied on [the Advisory Committee’s] well-considered
Notes as a useful guide in ascertaining the meaning of the Rules. . . ‘[T]he Committee’s commentary is
particularly relevant in determining the meaning of the document Congress enacted.’” (quoting Beech
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 165 n.9 (1988))).
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interpretation of the intent of the Rule’s drafters and was not based on
constitutional principles binding on rule-makers. To the extent that the
intent of the rule-makers has evolved with experience in implementation of
the Rule, an amendment that reflects that altered intent may indeed be
appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
Since its enactment, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) has created disparity in the
treatment of similarly situated prior consistent statements by trial
witnesses. A rule that sets up irrational and confusing distinctions between
evidence properly admitted at trial for identical rehabilitative purposes is
deleterious to the administration of justice generally and may even
generate unfair outcomes in some cases. The policies articulated in
support of original Rule 801(d)(1)(B) extend logically to cover other prior
consistencies admitted to repair witness credibility. Therefore, an
amendment to the Rule that would create uniformity in the treatment of
admitted prior consistent statements is in order.
Because of the detailed language describing rehabilitation practice in
the original Rule, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that language
in Tome, today’s trial lawyers and judges may be accustomed to using
current Rule 801(d)(1)(B) as a proxy for appropriate rehabilitative and
substantive use of prior consistencies. In contrast, the newly added
provision in the current proposed draft amendment fails to spell out the
particulars of proper rehabilitation and leaves that question for case-bycase consideration by trial judges. If the open-ended language of the
current proposal is retained, litigants may seek to use it similarly as a
general blessing for admission of prior consistent witness statements
following any impeaching attack not covered by the existing Rule. Such
use is not in line with the drafters’ intent for the amended Rule or with the
traditional common-law approach to rehabilitation with prior consistencies.
A liberal interpretation of the amended Rule arising out of current practice
under the Rule could indeed increase the improper use of pre-trial witness
statements as evidence.
The optimal solution would be a revision to the proposed amendment
applying a single standard to substantive availability of all prior
consistencies, regardless of the impeaching technique employed. Such a rule
should highlight expressly the threshold inquiry into proper non-hearsay use
for rehabilitative purposes as a condition precedent to substantive
availability. To echo the Advisory Committee Note to the original Rule, it is
only when the jury will have access to the prior consistency for repair
purposes that the hearsay exemption makes good common sense. While any
amendment that eliminates the long-standing strict Tome rule promises to be
controversial, this option is best suited to achieve true symmetry and
consistency for prior consistent statements in the trial process.

